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ABSTRACT
KELLY ANN USHER: Capturing the banner of batllismo: The Frente Amplio and the
end of the Uruguayan two-party system
(Under the direction of Oliver Dinius)
This paper looks at the 2004 presidential victory of the Frente Amplio in
Uruguay, as well as the party’s development since 1971 to explain how it became

victorious. The paper will also investigate what changes the two traditionally dominant
political parties have undergone in response to the Frente Amplio’s rise. Uruguayan
political science magazines and documents from the political parties themselves form the
foundation of this work, supplemented by research from books and academic writings.
Research showed that although the Frente Amplio started out as a radical leftist group, it
was able to become moderate and use political means of opposition rather than violent
means. The moderate left ideology espoused today by the Frente Amplio is defined by
batilismo, a Uruguayan political philosophy developed in the early 1900s and still so
strong today voters will switch parties to continue to uphold it. The Frente Amplio was
able to build substantial voter support and victory largely as a result of its adoption of
batllismo.

As a result, the two traditionally dominant parties have undergone an

ideological shift to the right and now show high levels of cooperation and voter sharing.
Although the system is now a three-party system, the traditional parties occupy nearly the
same space on the ideological spectrum and function as one focus of opposition to the
left, as if it were a two-party system. In conclusion, the 2004 Frente Amplio victory was
not a change so much as it was continuity with the batllista system in place in Uruguay

since the early 1900s, although it did create ideological change within the other two
parties.
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Introduction
Any traveler to Montevideo will see the word “Tabaré!” painted in big letters on
the sides of buildings and displayed on countless posters.

It is left over from the

campaigns for the 2004 presidential elections, which earned Dr. Tabaré Vazquez the
presidency of Uruguay. Living in Montevideo for a semester in 2008, I saw Vazquez’s
name everywhere, but the slogan never mentioned his party. The members of the family I
stayed with only talked about their preferred political party, the Colorados. In history
classes, I learned about the Colorado party as well as the Blanco party, dating back to
1836, and their rivalry throughout Uruguay’s history as an independent country. I never
learned anything about Vazquez’s party, however.
Research into Uruguayan politics revealed that Vazquez did not belong to either
traditional party, but rather to the Frente Amplio, a leftist coalition made up of socialists,
communists, Christian Democrats, and former militant guerrillas. Uruguay had been a
strictly two-party system consisting of the Blanco party and Colorado party only until the
creation of the Frente Amplio in 1971. Until then, no leftist party had ever been able to
exceed 10% of the vote, too little to exercise any influence in the government. Not only
was the Frente Amplio able to win seats in the legislative body, but they gathered enough
popular support to break the two-party system and win the presidential election with 50%
of the vote. All of this growth took place in only 33 years, during 11 of which the party’s
leaders were in exile and the movement forced underground. To me, it seemed that the
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Frente Amplio’s victory was even less probable than a third party presidential
victory in the United States. I understood the significance of the Frente Amplio’s victory,

but I wondered what had prepared the ground for this historic event. Conversations with
Uruguayans living in the United States revealed another interesting suggestion -- that the
traditional parties had begun to converge ideologically and were increasingly seen as two
sides of the same coin.

In such a strong two-party system, how did the Frente Amplio grow so quickly?
This question becomes even more interesting in that the Frente Amplio has managed to
grow popular despite guerrilla beginnings. The party also survived its period of being

outlawed under the dictatorship with its voter support largely intact. What about the
party’s ideology
traditional

gives the Frente Amplio

parties

-- unaccustomed

to

such popularity and power?

strong

leftist opposition

How

-- respond

did the
to

this

challenge? Is this ideological convergence of the two traditional parties taking place in
reaction to the Frente Amplio victory, or simply as a result of natural political evolution?
A case study of Uruguay can contribute to the study of other Latin American
countries that are part of the so-called “pink wave,” or the trend of rising leftist and
socialist governments

across

Latin America.

The

Frente

Amplio

government

is an

example of the “new left,” a brand of leftist ideals involving the balance of market
economics with social democratic and socialist ideals of wealth distribution and welfare.
The Uruguayan case offers valuable lessons on the trajectory and future of the moderate
left in South

America.

The

Frente

Amplio

experience

will

show

whether

market

economics and values of social equality can be balanced within a government without
losing

voter

support

from

either

side.

It will

also

show

whether

a moderate

left
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government can actually achieve its goals. Uruguay can also be compared with more
radical and populist leftist governments,

such as those of Venezuela,

Ecuador,

and

Bolivia, to demonstrate that moderate leftist countries of the pink wave enjoy higher

levels of economic success and political stability and loyalty.
Looking at other countries in this “new left” group, Brazil and Chile, and their
differences

and

similarities

with

Uruguay

offers

insight

to

why

the

Uruguayan

government has been successful and what the “new left” can change to become even
more successful. Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile have all enjoyed success with social welfare
programs. Uruguay and Chile had the most universal and redistributive social systems on
the continent until 1973, when an economic recession made the mounting cost of social

programs difficult to maintain and dictatorships came into power.’ When Brazil’s Partido
dos

Trabalhadores

(PT,

Workers’

Party)

began

to

win

positions

in the

national

government, they made social democratic programs and ideals a part of the government.’
All currently have social democratic governments with the aim of reform of the capitalist
system “through social policies that limit and correct the inequalities of the market.”’ To
achieve this aim, the governments have enacted similar social and economic programs.
The parties behind these governments share many characteristics, both in their beginnings

and development as well as in their current ideology and structure. The Concertacion in
Chile, the PT in Brazil, and the Frente Amplio in Uruguay are all parties that sprang from
radical movements but have since moved to adhere to center-left ideologies.

' Castiglioni, Rossana. The Politics of Social Policy Change in Chile and Uruguay. New Y ork: Routledge,
2005. 3.
* Baiocchi, Gianpaolo and Sofia Checa. “The New and the Old in Brazil’s PT.” Leftovers: Tales of the
Latin American Left. Eds. Castafieda, Jorge G. and Marco A. Morales. New York: Routledge, 2008. 105.
> Panizza, Francisco E. “The Social Democratisation of the Latin American Left.” Revista Europea de
Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe. Vol. 79. Oct 2005. 95.
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However,

the

Frente

Amplio

government

differs

from

the

PT

and _ the

Concertacién in its adherence to a traditional political ideology: batllismo, The Frente
Amplio built up its support slowly, and its voters show remarkable solidarity with the
coalition. The party’s goals and programs are rooted in the early 20th century Uruguayan

school of thought that has dominated the country’s development since its inception.
Batllismo, which first established the Uruguayan paternal state in the early 1900s, is

responsible for not only the ideological and programmatic differences between Uruguay,
Brazil and Chile but also for the Frente Amplio’s success in the polls — Uruguayan voters

follow batllismo.
Finding sources on Uruguay offers a challenge. Few scholars study the country,
possibly due to its small size and relative political stability. Very little has been written
about Uruguay

in English, making research on the country a more

challenging task.

Academic articles are available in Spanish, but there are few book-length studies in either
language. Primary sources prove hard to find in the United States, and periodicals and
magazines

often do not have

extensive online archives.

A weekly

political

science

magazine, Brecha, served as my main primary source. Other primary sources included
statistics and

figures from the Uruguayan

government,

accessible online, as well as

documents published by the parties themselves. Party documents used include campaign
platforms from the 2004 elections and documents written throughout the history of the
parties. Secondary sources consisted of numerous academic articles in Spanish, as well as
chapters from comparative studies on Latin America in English.
To fully understand the transformation of the party landscape, some historical

context is needed. The first chapter discusses the history of the bipartisan system from its
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birth in 1836 to the early 1970s. It looks at the origins of the two traditional parties, the
Blancos

and

the Colorados,

and the conflict between

the two

that dominated

early

Uruguayan politics. The chapter highlights the influence of Colorado leader José Batlle y
Ordéfiez, who
nationalized

in the early 20" century created Uruguay’s

industries. Batllismo,

social welfare system and

as the political philosophy

is called, shaped party

ideologies and still characterizes the Uruguayan state today. The party that voters regard

as the guardian or defender of batllismo has a political advantage, and this political
advantage helps to explain the major changes in party loyalty seen in Uruguay in the last
25 years. Information for the historical context was gleaned from multiple books and
academic journals, including the Gran Enciclopedia del Uruguay.
I will analyze

the Frente Amplio’s

history during the

1971

to 2004

period,

showing how a center-left coalition from militant roots became a dominant party. Tracing

the party’s history in dealing with these events will reveal the gradual move toward the
center-left position the coalition occupies now, as well as show how the Frente Amplio
was able to draw voters to their party and away from the traditional parties. A series of
events presented the Frente Amplio with an opportunity to become a more moderate style
of opposition: the transition from military dictatorship to democracy, the 2001 economic
crises,

and

Montevideo’s

Tabaré

Vazquez’

experience

stint

as

mayor

of a Frente Amplio

of Montevideo

from

1990

executive during Vazquez’s

to

1995.

mayorship

allowed them to witness the party’s direct democracy projects in action, as well as its
ability to handle social programs as promised. This is especially significant given that the
majority of Uruguayans lives in Montevideo, and was able to experience firsthand the
ideas the Frente Amplio wished to implement on a national scale. Along with academic
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journals and books, the sources used for this chapter include multiple party documents
from the Frente Amplio to show changes in their program and ideas over time.
The third chapter focuses on party politics from 1980 to 2004, and how it reveals
gradual shifts in Colorado and Blanco party ideology in response to the Frente Amplio’s
success. The chapter breaks the 1980 to 2004 period up by the separate presidencies of
the period, to show how the relationship between the parties changed with the election of
each new official. This reveals the overall trajectory of ideological change within the

traditional parties. The history of both the Blanco and the Colorado parties shows that the
parties rearrange themselves on the left to right spectrum, moving to the right in response

to the Frente Amplio, confirming that the left’s rise did in fact cause change to other
political parties and even convergence of the two traditional parties. A run through party
history also reveals that the Colorado party is no longer implementing batllismo, while
the Frente Amplio has gradually adopted that ideology for itself. To look in depth at the
parties’ activities and programs, I will use a Uruguayan political science magazine called
Brecha,

as well as electoral data from the Uruguayan

government,

among

academic

sources and books.
Finally, the fourth chapter will examine the three main parties’

ideologies

as

manifested in the election campaign of 2004. The discussion of the platforms shows the
programmatic convergence of the two traditional parties by showing the similarities in

their plans.

It also confirms the Frente Amplio’s position as the defender of batllismo

and the welfare state by outlining how maintenance of the batllista welfare state and
political ideology is central to the entire plan. The discussion of the platforms also shows

how the traditional parties couch their proposals in the ideological rhetoric used since the
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parties were founded. This is to lead voters to believe they have not changed their focus

so

that

the

original

voting

bloc

for

the

party

is

not

alienated.
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Chapter 1: Fundamentals of the political party system
Uruguay was established as a multi-party system almost at the same time as the

country was established. With the country’s independence won in 1830, the constitution
written that year set up a democracy with a bicameral legislature and a president, and two
political parties rapidly sprang up out of the factions in the civil conflict that followed.
The system continues to be a multiparty democracy today, and boasts over 60 years as a
democracy in the 20" century alone, outstripping many other countries. One scholar
refers to Uruguay

as “the Latin American

country that has lived the longest under

democratic regimes.”* The tenacity of the political parties and their constituents’ loyalty
contribute the most to this democratic stability. °
In practice,

however,

the actual

democratic

nature

of the

government,

and

authorization and activity of the political parties of the system varied. From 1834 to 1875,
civil wars between the political parties rendered the elected government ineffective; from
1875 to 1890, there were three military dictators; the period between 1897 and 1904 saw
another civil war between the political parties; in 1933 a formerly popularly elected
president became dictator through a coup, although the parties maintained a relatively

4 Sondrol, Paul C. “Paraguay and Uruguay: modernity, tradition, and transition.” Third World Quarterly.

Vol. 18, No. 1. Mar 1997; Cason, Jeffrey. “Electoral Reform and Stability in Uruguay.” Journal for

Democracy. Vol 11, No. 2. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 86.
> Cason, Jeffrey. “Electoral Reform, Institutional Change, and Party Adaptation in Uruguay.” Latin
American Politics & Society. 2002. Vol. 44, No. 3. pp 89-109. 92.
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high level of activity during this period; and from 1973 to 1984 Uruguay was again ruled
by military dictators. °

Despite these breaks in party activity, the political parties are

some of the healthiest parties in Latin America, claiming very high levels of member
loyalty.
Traditionally, Uruguay is a two-party system, with smaller independent parties
involved but not garnering significant portions of the vote. The National Party, more
commonly

referred

to

as

Blancos,

and

the

Colorado

Party

are

the

traditional

and

dominant parties. These parties were established close to the same time as the country
itself was,

and Uruguay’s

political history is characterized

by continual

action

and

reaction situations between the two parties. This may be due in part to the fact that the
parties were formed as a result of the civil war, known as the Guerra Grande, that took
place from 1834 to 1875, setting up a system of opposition and tension between the two
major parties.
The Colorados officially came together in 1836 under Fructuoso Rivera, taking
their name from the red (colorado in Spanish) uniforms they employed to distinguish
themselves during their rebellion against the government during the Guerra Grande.’ The
cause that brought them together was their support of the form of government that had
been in place prior to the establishment of the Banda Oriental as an independent country
named Uruguay.® Later, as the party coalesced, the Colorados became known as “liberal

modernizing

reformers.”

Rivera’s

triumph

in the

Guerra

Grande

Colorados as the leaders in urban areas. This urban dominance

established

allowed the party to

° Lindahl, Goran G. Uruguay’s New Path. Stockholm: Library and Institute of Ibero-American Studies,

1962. 9-22.

” Lindahl, 12.
* Peirano, Ricardo. Gran Enciclopedia del Uruguay. Vol. 4. 1214.

the
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quickly become

the most powerful of the two parties, since Uruguay’s

population

is

heavily concentrated in its largest city, Montevideo.” The Colorado Party continues to be
the dominant party, as the most elected party in Uruguayan history and the only party to
have presidents who have served more than once.’

Traditionally, the Colorados have supported a strong welfare state, with import
substitution industrialization to finance the programs. Later, when import substitution no
longer functioned in the small Uruguayan market, their economic policy began to focus

on nationalized industries to underpin the welfare state. The party also tends to oppose
clerical influence on the country more than the Blancos.'!

The Blanco Party was established in 1836 as well, in response to the Colorado
uprising, under the leadership of Manuel Oribe. Antonio Lavalleja, a hero of the Guerra
Grande, is often also named as an early leader. They were dubbed Blancos because of
their white badges worn during the Guerra Grande. Initially the party’s focus was to
maintain Argentine influence over Uruguay, allying with Buenos Aires to push for the
Banda

Oriental’s

reintegration

into

the

Argentine

Federation.

In

1872,

the

party

attempted to reorganize and re-identify itself as a party of the nation by renaming the
party. The new name, Partido Nacional, was voted to replace Partido Blanco at the 1887
convention, although the party remained the same and continues to be referred to as the
Partido Blanco even today.'”
Blancos have long been the party of the rural areas of Uruguay, using it as their
base of power during the Guerra Grande and maintaining dominance in the rural areas

° Lopez-Alves, Fernando. “State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900.” Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2000. 56, 71.

'° Peirano, Vol. 4, 1215.
'' Cason 2000, 86.

"2 Peirano, Vol. 4, 1212, 1220; Lopez-Alves, 69-70.
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even

after the

conflict’s

conservatives,”

resolution.

They

are

identified

traditionally supporting a more centralized

as “traditional,
government

rural-based

with a strong

bureaucracy in opposition to the Colorados’ early love of liberty and liberalization.'’ The
party changed this traditional ideology during the 1973-84 dictatorship, adopting a more
radical

strategy

and

Ferreira Aldunate,

openly

rebellious

tactics

against the dictatorship

an exile.

However,

in ideology

the Blancos

under

continue

Wilson

to be

the

champion of the rural areas, which vote Blanco even today, with Blanco intendentes
consistently picking up a majority of the rural departments during elections.4

Batlle and batllismo
To properly describe the system as it stands today requires a description of its
development.

Although

the country

became

independent

in 1830, the contemporary

political structure did not begin to coalesce until the early 1900s.'° Elites controlled the
early political structure, which involved little popular participation and a great deal of
political maneuvering and fraud. As a result, many important figures from both parties
stand

out

in this time

period

as architects

and

leaders

of contemporary

ideology.

However, a Colorado leader named José Batlle y Orddjiez, president from 1903 to 1907
and 1911 to 1915 and described as the “most powerful political figure in the country’s

history,” stands above the rest, and as such continues to dominate the Uruguayan political
consciousness.'° A picture of Batlle can be found on the Colorado Party website and all
their literature,

on bumper

stickers

and canteens

around

3 L6pez-Alves, 56, 68-71.
'* Corte Electoral, Government of Uruguay. Montevideo, Uruguay.

> Lindahl, 10, 16-18.
'S Peirano, Vol. 4, 1216.

Montevideo,

and

in many
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candidates’ campaign posters and tools. An allusion to his political ideology can — and
does — change voting patterns.
Elected as president in 1903, Batlle consolidated his power decisively and began
to develop
Saravia, who

his political strategy — batllismo.
had been

He defeated Blanco

caudillo

Aparicio

leading a series of rebellions in the rural areas against the

Colorado leadership, and was able to officially reestablish the constitutional president’s
power over the entire country and turn his attention to his plans for reform, a key part of
batllismo. Between 1907 and 1911, Batlle was not in the presidency, and spent the entire
period traveling through Europe. Upon returning to Uruguay in 1911, Batlle was reelected to the presidency

and took office until

1915.

He

did not recede

into the

background of politics after his last stint in the presidency, however, but instead remained
a dominant figure in Colorado politics until his death in 1929."
Batllismo, Batlle’s political legacy, is a political doctrine with four main bases:
adherence to capitalism balanced with protectionist policies and economic intervention
by the state, total separation from the Catholic Church,

a liberal approach to social

policies, and reform of the electoral system to allow greater participation and eliminate
corruption.'® Above all, batllismo tried to create social solidarity and stronger allegiances
to the country in the hearts of citizens. Many of the policies following the principles of

batllismo were believed to be too progressive or forward-looking for such a small and
young country. However, Batlle believed that these attributes of the country only made
the need for progressive policies that much greater, in that there were no established “old
ways” to supplant and vices to correct. He believed the future of the country would be

"7 Peirano, Vol. 1, 173-176.
'8 Deirano, Vol. 1, 177.
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that much easier for never having to confront the problems faced by the larger and older
nations.!”

Batlle’s

economic

plan

mixed

social

and

political

policies

from

a social

democratic background with a professed commitment to capitalism. Socialism is not an

appropriate word for Batlle’s beliefs and program, although the opposition to batllismo
especially liked to bring up the apparent socialist nature of the program in order to expose
it as radical and replace it with their own programs. While Batlle believed that inequality
was rampant in a capitalist society, he did not believe that this inequality was the result of
a class struggle. Instead, he believed it was the result of poorly-planned government
practices for distribution of resources, and intended to fix it with his political program.”°
Batlle’s
services

government

corporations

that

created
played

state-owned
a key

role

industrial,
for

the

public

Uruguayan

utility, and

public

economy.

These

corporations were called entes autonomos, and attempted to ensure just treatment of all
members of the society as well as prevent foreign intervention and the accumulation of
debt from

foreign loans. The

ente was to contribute to social justice by countering

capitalism’s distribution problems through an emphasis on cheap services and higher
wages without the emphasis on profit. Batlle dodged the problem of inefficiency inherent
in state-owned corporations by setting each ente up as an individual unit to allow the
company
individual

to have “an enthusiasm for the economic struggle, and the mentality of the
trader.””!

After

the

end

of Batlle’s

second

presidency,

the

state

held

'° Weinstein, Martin. “Uruguay: the Politics of Failure.” Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975.
21, 26-28.

?° Weinstein, 22, 23.
7! Weinstein, 24, 25.

a
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monopoly on insurance and electricity, among other holdings, and had nationalized two

major banks, which funded public and athletic construction projects.”
The economic plan to remove Uruguay from foreign debt hinged on control of
public utilities through entes. Before the batilista program, the majority of utilities, save
electricity, were controlled by British monopolies,

meaning that the Uruguayan

state

could only collect profits through taxes on these companies and the companies were free
to take advantage of the Uruguayan people as they wished. Initially, the British interest
had helped Uruguay become one of the first nations to modernize, with electricity and
telephones.

The national control of these utilities became

important to keep Uruguay

from becoming another nation indebted to foreign companies or sunk into foreign loans.”°
The formal separation of church and state bears mentioning in that Uruguay is an
outlier among
Catholicism

Latin American
is the dominant

nations in the secular nature of its society. Although
religion, Uruguay

never had an official religion,

never

harbored very many Catholic missionaries in the colonial period, and had an anti-clerical
movement

that started immediately after independence.

The batllista program

simply

codified the separation between church and state to ensure the church would no longer
have any opportunity to influence the state.”4 Batlle’s personal anti-clericalism became a
focal point of the opposition to batilismo, which

attempted to play on the religious

sentiments of the population to turn them against the program entirely and used religious
organizations to help organize opposition.”*

” Peirano, Vol. 1, 133, 177.
Rosenthal, Anton. “Dangerous Streets: Trolley, Labor Conflict, and the Reorganization of Public Space
in Montevideo, Uruguay.” Cities of Hope. Eds. Ronn Pineo and James A. Baer. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1998. 43; Weinstein, 24.

*4 Hudson, Rex A. and Sandra W. Meditz, eds. Uruguay: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the
Library of Congress, 1990. <http://countrystudies.us/uruguay/>. “Religion.”

> Weinstein, 37.
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Batlle’s social policies focused on the protection of Uruguay’s workers, which
was key due to the large share of the national population living in Montevideo
working

in urban

extremely

conditions.

progressive,

and

Many

of the social welfare programs

as a result,

Uruguay

is described

were

and

considered

as a “pioneer

in this

sphere.””° His program saw the establishment of a eight-hour workday with an obligatory
weekend off work, retirement pensions, unemployment programs, the right to strike, and
protections for women laborers and against child labor. Women’s rights were advanced
with the passage of laws allowing unilateral divorce on the part of the woman, and the
establishment of a women’s university. Education was also important, and legislation was
passed to create a system of free secular education, secondary schools, a newly-minted
Minister of Education in the Uruguayan federal government, new departments and majors
added to the public university, and night schools opened for workers.

Other reforms

included social security and the abolition of the death penalty.7’
Batlle’s visit to Europe during the interim period between his two presidencies
shaped the social part of the batilista program, as he borrowed elements from the many
political and social systems there for implementation in his own nascent country. Batlle
had a penchant for following the European example as closely as possible; for instance,
the social welfare net was in part underpinned by a new organization, created in 1910 and
called the Asistencia Publica Nacional, which was created from the nationalization of
independent charity organizations.

The idea for this organization came

directly from

Europe, specifically France.”° Many of the laws enacted in Uruguay were the first of their
kind outside of Europe. Some laws, like the legalization of unilateral divorce on the part
6 | indahl, 23-24.
27 Deirano, Vol. 1, 174, 179-180.
8 Peirano, Vol. 1, 174.
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of women passed in 1913, were quite literally the first of their kind at all — even Europe
was not as progressive as Batlle’s Uruguay in some aspects.”
Some parts of the social program were not realized due to opposition, such as
profit-sharing

for employees

and

workers

in state-owned

enterprises

or inexpensive

medical service offered by an appointed public service doctor. The opposition became
especially heated on the subject of his proposed tax policies. Batlle’s proposed party
program published in 1919 called for the reduction of labor taxes in favor of higher land,
inheritance,

gift, foreign investment,

and import taxes. The program

also allowed

the

state to expropriate land by paying 40 percent more than the appraised value of a piece of
land. To summarize Batlle’s idea of property rights, all land belonged to the state and the
taxes on it were rent paid by the people holding the land to the state for its use as opposed
to tax on property owned by those holding it — a highly socialist conception of property
rights. These

programs

failed, but the threat of more

extreme policies allowed

the

Colorados to pass other parts of the batllista agenda and place the burden of the cost of
the social programs on the shoulders of the landed elite through absentee land taxes,
among other taxes.°°
Finally, batilismo called for reform of the electoral system to allow greater public
participation. Some of the main reasons Batlle believed in the extensive social network he
had attempted to implement pertained to the idea of a “participant, aware citizenry” and
social solidarity: a commitment on the part of the state to the wellbeing of its citizens

” Birn, Anne-Emanuelle. “Uruguay on the World Stage: How Child Health Became an International
Priority.” American Journal of Public Health. Vol. 95, No. 9. Sept 2005.
3° Weinstein, 28-31.
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meant that the citizens were more likely to uphold their responsibility to be an active part
of the political process and stay informed.?!
The idea of a collegial executive formed the most radical part of the batllista
political agenda. In 1913 he proposed to change the Uruguayan system to mirror that of

Switzerland in that the president would be replaced by a junta of nine members, each
elected for nine years with annual elections to replace one of the nine. The opposition to

this plan came not only from the Blancos but also from within Batlle’s own party, who
split into factions of colegialistas and anticolegialistas.” While the main objective of a
collegial government appears to be the reinforcement of direct democracy according to

Batlle’s vision of participatory democracy, the collegial executive would also serve to
block the Blancos from gaining any further political power, since to gain a majority in the
executive they would need to win at least six consecutive elections.**

Batlle’s presidency ended in 1915 before the controversy over the collegial
government was determined, but based on his influence within his own party the idea of
an executive council continued to be a central point of debate. The parties eventually

came to a compromise, and the 1919 constitution set up a president and a council to share

power in the executive.*’ This experiment lasted only until 1933, although the collegial
executive enjoyed a resurgence from 1952 to 1966.*°

>! Weinstein, 26-27.
* Tindahl, 22-25.

33 Altman, David. “Collegiate Executives and Direct Democracy in Switzerland and Uruguay: Similar
Institutions, Opposite Political Goals, Distinct Results.” Swiss Political Science Review. Vol 14, No. 3.
2008. 484.

4 Peirano, Vol. 1, 174; Lindahl, 22-31,
°° Altman 2008, 484.
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Batllismo through the years

After Batlle’s second

presidency

ended

in 1915, the implementation

of the

batilista program suffered a setback with the election of Feliciano Viera. Although Viera

was Colorado, he was a member of the anticolegialista faction of the party, some of
whom not only opposed the collegial executive but also the entire batllista program. In

Viera’s opinion, batllismo had moved too quickly and was alienating the support from
capital sectors in favor of labor. His proclaimed halt of bat/lista progress is known as the
Alto de Viera.*® Despite the Alto and a continual and growing dissention with Batlle over
the political structure of both the country and the Colorado Party, Viera nonetheless
passed several laws to continue the social reform portion of the program.*’ His conflict
with Batlle and disagreement with the batllista program proved that Batlle’s ideology
would encounter opposition not only from outside groups, but also from within his own
party.

The

batllista Colorados

experienced

further problems

when

in October

1929

Batlle died. The U.S. stock market crash, which occurred the same month, also brought
Uruguay into an economic crisis that batllismo could not fix. Terra, the Colorado elected
in 1930, dissolved the collegial government and abandoned the batllista program to carry
out a coup in 1933 with the help of the antibatllista Blancos. Although Terra acted as a
dictator, dissolving both the collegial council and the legislature, the parties remained
active during this period and the baillista laws already passed remained in effect.
Terra’s removal in 1942 opened the door for Luis Batlle Berres, nephew of the
original Batlle, to take the lead in politics and bring in the neobatilismo movement,

36 Weinstein, 39.

371 indahl, 25-29, 43.

Usher 19

reviving the old program and its aims. Batlle Berres built support among the urban and
working

classes,

remaining

protected

foreign-owned

industry,

utilities.

He

subsidized
described

agriculture,

and

his understanding

nationalized

the

of the state as a

“defense against ‘grandes consorcios internacionales’ (large international firms). ”**
The neobatilista program found new opponents:

orthodox baitillistas within the

Colorado Party led by José Batlle y Orddfiez’s own sons, Lorenzo and César. They took
up the fight for a wholly collegial government and were supported

by the orthodox

batllistas. This brought them into confrontation with Batlle Berres’ plan for the country.
The opposition to neobatllismo within both the Blanco and Colorado parties resulted in a
1952 constitutional reform recreating the collegial executive. The cooperation between
the parties was evident in the construction of the council: six of the nine members were to
be from the party garnering a majority of votes, with the other three seats reserved for the
minority

party.’

Although

both

defending original components

Batlle

Berres

and

Batlle

y Ordéfiez’s

sons

were

of the batillista program, the division of the Colorado

party between the two caused the program itself to become divided into parts.
Luis Alberto de Herrera, a Blanco leader, led his party in passionate opposition to
batllismo, and is sometimes referred to as Batlle’s only political equal. His opposition
centered

on his support for foreign capital and his stance against social legislation.

Herrera seemed to believe that the lower classes needed to work in menial labor to keep
the Uruguayan economy running rather than be afforded rights to education or other
policies attempting to bring them up into the middle class. He almost never spoke on

38 Weinstein, 68-81.
° Weinstein, 81-83.
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social policy except to speak against batllismo and very rarely authored any social policy
of his own.””
His status as a central figure in the Blanco party allowed him to make many
alliances with powerful groups to help bring the Blancos to office and keep batllismo out.

One important alliance was with the Liga Federal de Accién Ruralista (LFAR), the heart
of the rural political movement. Its leader became a friend of Herrera’s and united with
the Herrerista Blancos, bringing rural support for Blancos and opposition to batllismo
and its urban focus to their zenith. Both leaders used the media to attack batllismo, the
LFAR leader attacking it as a Communist and atheistic program and Herrera attacking it
as immoral and an exaggerated social commitment.”!
The alliance of ruralismo and the Blancos worked:

in the 1958 elections the

Blancos won 6 of the 9 seats on the Executive Council, 17 of the 31 Senate seats, and 51
of the 99 seats in the Chamber of Representatives.” However, the Blancos were not able
to change much, due to the power-sharing agreements in the collegial executive and state
corporations. Herrera died in 1959, and the antibatllista movement lost its vigor.
At the same

time,

the bickering

among

parties

and within

parties

and

the

emergence of economic problems meant that the batllista program was largely halted in
its progress."? The political stagnation of the 1950s and 1960s, soon to be coupled with
economic crisis, would lead to the 1973 repressive dictatorship. During the dictatorship
period, batllismo fell by the wayside, as the parties had to be occupied with their survival
and

pushing

for

a_

“° Weinstein, 40-41.

‘! Weinstein, 40-46.

” Corte Electoral, 1958 election data.
“ Weinstein, $4.

retum

to

democracy’

rather

than

reform.
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Chapter 2: Rise of the Frente Amplio
The Frente Amplio’s victory in the presidential elections of 2004 represented a
milestone that was a long time coming. Since its inception in 1971 as a party of the
radical left, the Frente Amplio has continuously adapted to the political realities in
Uruguay and grew stronger in every election. Their victory in the 1990 Montevideo
municipal elections allowed voters to experience a Frente Amplio government for the
first time. The success of direct democracy and participatory mechanisms in Montevideo
benefited the Frente Amplio nationally at the expense of the Colorados and Blancos: in
1994, the three major parties each won approximately 30% of the vote. The Frente
Amplio grew with the incorporation of other opposition parties, in 1994 and again in
2002, resulting in today’s incarnation of the party, the Encuentro

Progresista-Frente

Amplio-Nueva Mayoria. Internal divisions temporarily weakened the party from 1984 to
1989 and again in 1996, but Tabaré Vazquez, current president of Uruguay, reunited the
party into a cohesive movement. Under Vazquez’s leadership, the party not only won the
2004 presidential election but also gained majorities in both legislative chambers.
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Beginnings
General Liber Seregni founded the Frente Amplio in 1971. It was a coalition of
the

marginalized

parties,

including

communists,

socialists,

Christian

Democrats,

members of the traditional parties and the militant Tupamaro guerrillas.’ The member
parties had previously captured small shares of the national vote, often less than 1%, and
with almost no voters outside of the urban center of Montevideo. The 1964 foundation of
a national workers’ union as well as the 1968 foundation of the Movement for Defense of
Freedom and Sovereignty were precursors to the coalition, helping to spread the idea for
a united movement and garnering support for the left.”°
The

party defined itself ideologically with the “First 30 Measures”

in 1971.

Batllismo figured centrally in the program — extensive social plans to bolster education,
youth, health, and various other components of the traditional Uruguayan social welfare
state built on the original social welfare state of the early 1900s. A batillista tendency to
blame

foreign

involvement

and

greedy

private

interests within

the country

for the

economic crisis of the 1970s led the party to focus on agrarian reform and nationalization
of banking and major industries. Redistribution of income, decentralization, and a deep
distrust of foreign economic actors marked the party’s ideology from the beginning. The
party also promised to strive for greater transparency in government and fewer privileges
for public servants, another key component of batilismo."6

“ Luna, Juan Pablo, “Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social Democratic Alternative in Uruguay.”
Latin American Politics and Society. Vol. 49, No. 4. 5. [What is the page number?]

“ Nahum, 161.

“° Frente Amplio. “Primeras 30 Medidas de Gobierno.” 25 Aug 1971. 1-2, 8.
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The Frente Amplio’s party structure was different from that of the Colorados and

Blancos, exhibiting the characteristics of a organizationally unified party rather than of a
weak coalition. The traditional parties had competing fractions loosely bound by a central
executive and a common political goal, while the Frente Amplio’s central executive used
a streamlined decision-making process, giving each fraction a veto in order to promote
unanimity.

More

importantly,

the party

has always

presented

only

one

presidential

candidate.*” Grassroots participation played a greater role in the formulation of the Frente
Amplio’s

goals

and party

activity.“*

Party documents

platform call for greater use of plebiscites

laying out the frenteamplista

and referenda to place control

of the

government in citizens’ hands, as well as a legislative body that does not impede civil
input.””

Role during the dictatorship
The Frente Amplio did not gain a place in official Uruguayan politics in the early
1970s

because of the activities of the Tupamaro

guerrillas. The Tupamaros,

movement was officially called the National Liberation Movement

whose

(MLN), wanted to

institute socialism and fight imperialism, turning to violence and upheaval to achieve
their goals. After several people linked to the government were murdered, the acts were
attributed to the Tupamaros and the government declared a “state of internal war,” giving
the armed

forces

freedom

of action within the country

against the subversives.

‘7 Altman, David, Rossana Castiglioni, and Juan Pablo Luna. “Uruguay: a Successful Role Model.”
Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left. Eds. Jorge G. Castafieda and Marco A. Morales. New York:

Routledge, 2008. pp 151-173. 154-155.

“’ Nahum, 162.

Frente Amplio 1971; Frente Amplio. “Bases programaticas de la unidad.” 9 Aug 1984.

°° Nahum, 159-164.

~°
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Politically part of the Frente Amplio, the Tupamaros continued guerrilla strikes against

an increasingly repressive government, which ultimately led to the military coup of 1973.
When the military denied a frenteamplista senator his rights, the majority of legislative
members refused to support the move, which led to the dissolution of the legislative
bodies.*!
The dictatorship immediately classified the Frente Amplio as an “enemy”

and

made the party illegal. It imprisoned Seregni; the party nevertheless continued to serve as
vocal opposition to the military government. In 1975, members of the Communist Party,
part of the Frente Amplio, were jailed by the hundreds. * The repression had so escalated

that “by 1976 Uruguay had the highest per capita level of political prisoners in the
world,” most of whom

were members

of the Frente Amplio. Many

leftists left the

country, but that did not necessarily guarantee safety. Operation Condor, a coordinated
campaign

by

Southern

Cone

militaries

to

eliminate

“internal

enemies,”

targeted

prominent members of the Uruguayan opposition in Argentina. In 1976, its commandos
assassinated a high-profile frenteamplista senator and a popular Blanco
Frente Amplio
multiple

senator in exile internationally denounced

countries,

while

within

the country

the events

the party maintained

senator.>

A

in Uruguay

in

an

underground

organization dedicated to justice and truth. °* The Frente Amplio initially remained illegal
when the government began to re-open the political system in 1980. In 1979, there were

still 3,000 political prisoners being held by the regime. * Seregni was still in jail and
°' Kaufman, Edy. “The Role of the Political Parties in the Redemocratization of Uruguay.” Repression,
Exile, and Democracy: Uruguayan Culture. Eds. Sail Sosnowski and Louise B. Popkin. Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1993. pp 17-58. 20-21.

*? Nahum, 171-172.

°3 Kaufman, 29.
*4 De Brito, 70.
°> Kaufman, 32.
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other leaders remained in exile abroad. However, the Blancos and Colorados recognized

the Frente Amplio’s broad base of support and began forging ties with the left to speed
the transition to democracy

through broader social mobilization. The

Frente Amplio

joined with traditional parties to organize a demonstration in which 10% of the entire
country participated, as well as a general strike and other demonstrations.”

Colorado ambitions to keep the Blancos out of power led to the full inclusion of
the Frente Amplio in the political system. The Blancos were the more liberal and left than
the Colorados, who

feared that leftist voters might unite behind the Blancos.

Colorado

leader Julio Maria Sanguinetti pushed for the legalization of moderate sectors of the
Frente Amplio. The Blancos had also begun to reach out to the Frente Amplio to form a
leftist alliance, but the Frente Amplio

worried

about becoming just another Blanco

fraction. It was willing to accept moderation in exchange for its own space in the system.
The military considered the Frente Amplio more moderate than the Blancos and allowed
the coalition into the system and negotiations. In 1984, it released Seregni, along with
other prisoners, and legalized the Socialist and Christian Democrat fractions of the Frente
Amplio.*’ This broadened the potential voter base in the political center, but led to
internal tension. Some leaders felt that the participation in negotiation with the military
betrayed the original principles — within the coalition, negotiations only had the support
of 14 of 31 leaders, with six abstentions.
The election results from 1984 suggest that the Frente Amplio’s role as opposition
to the military and its new definition as an acceptable member of the political sphere had

6 De Brito, 70.

>7 De Brito, 70-74.

8 De Brito, 79.
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not been forgotten: it won 21.3% of the vote compared to 18.3% in 1971.7 The gain of
three percent was significant given that the party had been illegal for 11 years, with its
leaders scattered in exile or jail. This vote, however, was split nearly evenly between

moderate and radical members of the coalition: 51% of the vote went to moderates such
as the Christian Democrats and the former Colorados of Lista 99, while 49% went to the

more radical Communist and Socialist parties.
Ideologically, the Frente Amplio remained true to the 1971 “First 30 Measures.”
The

party

focused

on

guarantees

of basic

freedoms

and

rights

as well

as citizen

participation through plebiscites, referenda, and popular initiatives, which it saw as a
check on executive power. The Frente Amplio’s platform emphasized the constitutional
elements of direct democracy and decentralization of authority to maintain a profile as
strong opposition without becoming more radical. It encouraged center-left voters to
support

the coalition as opposed

dictatorship period had

to remaining

loyal

to the traditional

parties.

The

led the party to set a goal of attaining deeper procedural

democracy.°!
Batllismo dominated the new economic plans, which involved maintaining the
paternal state presence in the economy in nationalized companies. The Frente Amplio
acknowledged

the labor movement

that had helped birth the party by asserting the

necessity for labor organization and worker access to resources. The party also called for

°° Corte Electoral, “Elecciones Nacionales 1971,” “Elecciones Nacionales 1984.”
°° De Brito, 96.

*! Goldfrank, Benjamin. “The Fragile Flower of Local Democracy: A Case Study of
Decentralization/Participation in Montevideo.” Politics & Society. Mar 2002. Vol. 30, No. 1. pp 51-83. 55.
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agrarian reform to take resources from large capitalist companies for use by small
farmers. Social programs included a reaffirmation of the batilista welfare state.”

The Frente Amplio, instead of forming coalitions with the traditional parties to

reach compromises in policy, developed alliances with non-governmental actors and
center-left members of both the traditional parties and other parties to block policy. This
was instrumental in areas of social policy, like pension reform, as well as practice of
government.® The internal problems signaled by the split vote in 1984, however, plagued
the party, keeping it from increasing its voting base. The radical sectors, represented by

the Communist and Socialist parties, and moderate sectors, represented by the Christian
Democrats

along

with lists of former

traditional party members,

proved

difficult to

balance, and compromises were difficult, keeping the party from being as active as it
could have been — “[The party’s] internal problems almost paralyzed it during this entire
period [1984-1989]. That loss of vigor and initiative as the opposition...put it in danger,
even its very existence.”

Experience in government
The 1989 elections heralded a new opportunity for the Frente Amplio to prove the
worth of its ideas and programs: Tabaré Vazquez was elected mayor of Montevideo.
Montevideo’s

population

constituted

44.4%

of the total population

of the country,

according to the 1985 census.” The Frente Amplio’s victory in Montevideo not only

* Frente Amplio 1984.
* Altman, Castiglioni, & Luna, 158-159.
6 Portillo, Alvaro and Enrique Gallicchio. “Los uruguayos votaron con la cabeza.” Brecha. Montevideo,

Uruguay. 23 Feb 1990. pp 18-20. 18.
® Itendencia Municipal de Montevideo. “Poblacién.” Presentacién Estadistica de la Ciudad de

Montevideo. <http://www.montevideo.gub.uy/estadisticas/pre.html>.
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symbolized its growing popularity in the country, but also a chance for the party to put its

plans into action and, if successful, directly impact nearly half of the country — as Seregni
said,

“...on

Tabaré

discussed Vazquez’s

Vazquez’s

government,

we

stake

our

future.”®°

stint as mayor as a test of the Frente Amplio:

Other

writers

“It’s the Frente

Amplio’s time to demonstrate now that we can continue accepting it as a good leader.”®”
The party also won 21 seats in the Chamber of Representatives and 7 seats in the
Senate.® In the legislative branch, the party maintained its staunch opposition to the
traditional parties, offering alternative plans for education, reduction of the deficit, and
other plans.
From the beginning of 1990, the Frente Amplio stated their intentions to put direct
democracy
Montevideo.

and

decentralization

Seregni,

into

practice

as the party’s president,

in

the

municipal

government

issued these statements:

“The

of

Frente

Amplio will govern Montevideo with pluralism, participation, and with the support of
elected professionals to attain the most efficient and transparent management in the city’s
history.””° The party hoped that greater citizen participation would result in a more
effective social welfare system due to expanded information on actual problems in the
society and how they should be prioritized. Participation was also to result in more
citizen civic awareness and participation, and the party wished to allow citizen input not

°° Seregni, Liber. 22 Nov 1989. Quoted by Cherro, Luis Martinez. “El artiguismo se mudé a Montevideo.”

Brecha. 12 Jan 90. 15.
87 Bermejo, Emesto Gonzalez. “Un boleto para el Uruguay.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 16 Feb 1990.

2
8 Corte Electoral, “Elecciones Nacionales 1989.”
® Elissalde, Roberto. “La oposicién tiene proyectos.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 9 Mar 90. 8; Blixen,
Samuel. “El sablazo esta en el aire.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 9 Mar 1990. 2.
” Seregni, Liber. Quoted by Bruschera, Oscar. “Los 19 afios del Frente Amplio.” Brecha. Montevideo,

Uruguay. 9 Feb 1990. 5.
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just in information

gathering

but

in actual

decision-making.’'

Two

major

projects

dominated Vazquez’s term as intendente and set him apart from any previous intendente:
a 40% decrease in cost of public transportation, and the creation of Zonal Community

Centers (CCZs). Questions of how to pay for these two programs without increasing the
budget, as Vazquez promised, arose even before they were instituted.”

The 40% decrease in ticket price for public transportation proposed to take 20%
from the municipal budget and 20% from the national budget. However, in planning the
party had

assumed

the

government

would

cooperate

without

actually

assessing

its

likelihood. Since Lacalle, the Blanco president at the time, was focusing on financial
adjustment and paying off debts, cooperation was unlikely.’? Vazquez stated that the
money for the ticket cost would come from a reorganization of the municipal budget, in
which the party would reprioritize programs and allocate funds accordingly. He also
stated his intention to tax higher classes in order to solve long-standing social and
economic problems in the city, viewing it as their commitment to the solidarity of their
city.”4
The

Frente

Amplio

experimented

with

its first decentralization/participation

program in Montevideo from 1990 until 1993. Vazquez divided the city into 18 zones
with a CCZ for administrative purposes in each zone. Each CCZ had a team to respond to
any needs that arose in their zone (decentralization), as well as to organize general and
thematic meetings for residents and social organization members to attend (participation).
Vazquez and his cabinet would attend a different center each week. Participation was

”' Goldfrank, 52, 56.
” Urruzola, Maria. “Cémo rebajar sin aumentar.” Brecha. 2 Feb 1990. 10.

” Urruzola 02/02/90, 10.

™ Vazquez, Tabaré. Interview with Carlos Amorin. “Las ideas en accion.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay.

16 Feb 1990. 4.
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immediate and vast — 25,000 citizens and 60% of local associations began attending the
CCZs

to

voice

administrative

concerns
tasks

and

addressed

demands.
more

The

CCZs

efficiently,

since

also
going

allowed

citizens

to the main

to

get

municipal

building was no longer necessary.’°

While the decentralization measures had accomplished their goal of efficiency,
success of participation had created a need for greater organization to address the
extensive list of demands from Montevideans. The system also lacked institutionalization
to make the committees and meetings a legitimate part of the government as opposed to a
forum for the airing of grievances.
In 1993, the Frente Amplio revised its program to include the opposition in its
scheme as well as to stabilize and institutionalize the process. Each zone was given a five
member

junta

appointed

(board),

as the

parties

two

opposition

chose,

and

and
a local

three ruling party
council

members

of elected

elected

“neighbors.”

or
The

“neighbors’ council” replaced the constantly-changing general and thematic meetings,
while the junta managed decentralized authority in the zone. These changes, although
maintaining social programs’ and services’ efficiency and speed through decentralization,
limited participation by adding a layer, albeit it an elected one, between Vazquez as
mayor and the people.”°

Rising opposition from the traditional parties
Despite

the

decreased

participation

resulting

from

the

post-1993

system

demonstrated in decreased CCZ and meeting attendance, the Frente Amplio’s popularity

5 Goldfrank, 57-59.
”© Goldfrank, 59-62.
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continued to rise with their success in Montevideo. In the 1994 elections, the party won
the intendencia

of Montevideo

again,

although

Vazquez

left the post.”

Despite

the

emergence of the Nuevo Espacio, another leftist coalition that had snatched 5% of the
leftist vote away, the Frente Amplio took 29.2% of the total vote. The tripartite system in

Uruguay had almost reached parity, with each party’s vote only fractions of percentage
points away from

30%.

The Frente Amplio

representatives in the Chamber.’®

gained 9 Senate seats and 31

By now, the Frente Amplio

of the 99

had gained the name

Encuentro Progresista — Frente Amplio. The EP was originally a separate leftist coalition
made up of former Blancos, Colorados, and frenteamplistas, and joined the Frente
Amplio to make the opposition to the traditional parties even stronger.
The left’s growing power forced the traditional parties to push an electoral reform
through a plebiscite in 1996. The reform eliminated the original voting system, which
consolidated all elections into one day and allowed multiple candidates to run per party.
The new system only allowed one presidential candidate per party and established four
separate elections, one providing

for a presidential run-off after the initial election.

Although the reform was entirely designed to keep the left from winning by forcing a
runoff so that the traditional parties could share voters in the runoff, the concession of
single presidential candidates appealed to some members of the left. While Vazquez,
then-president of the Frente Amplio, opposed the reforms, Danilo Astori, an influential
party leader, supported it. Other party leaders also supported the reform, and instead of
not participating in the Frente Amplio’s campaign against the reform they launched their

” Goldfrank, 61.
*8 Corte Electoral, “Elecciones Nacionales 1994.”
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own campaign in favor.” Liber Seregni, despite statements to support Vazquez’s
decision as leader of the party, also supported the reform.®® The reform did eventually
pass the plebiscite, although barely so.
The close vote on the constitutional reform revealed that the left had come to have
significant impact on public opinion and voting since the end of the dictatorship. Brecha,
a Uruguayan political science magazine, interpreted two trends in the vote: voters no
longer felt the need to stick to their party regardless of their satisfaction with it, but would

switch if they felt their party was no longer following policy lines with which they
agreed; and voters no longer distrusted the left, which had proven itself moderate and
successful in its time holding the mayor position in Montevideo. *!
The impact of Tabaré Vazquez’s personal popularity also became quite clear in
the midst of the internal contention over support or opposition to the reform. Vazquez’s
popularity began to transform him into the primary director of party ideology, and also
began to create divisions within the Frente Amplio. Traditionally, socialist or leftist
parties were viewed as reactionary, not pro-active — they did better as a defender of

liberties than an enactor of policies.** Vazquez had made the party over to be a pro-active
opposition,

proposing

alternate

plans,

enacting

brand-new

policies

in Montevideo.

Instead of being a coalition, the party was “transform[ing] towards a trend of a single
political movement: Vazquismo.” 83 Never before had anyone been able to unite the party
behind one agenda.

” Scovi, Manuela and Marcelo Pereira. “La campaiia del ‘vale todo’.” Brecha. 22 Nov 1996. 4,
*° Pereira, Marcelo. “La era del vazquismo.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 13 Dec 1996. 3.

*! Pereira 13/12/96, 3.

® Debray, Régis. “El future de la izquierda.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 6 Apr 1990. 16.

* Pereira 13/12/96, 5.
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the Frente Amplio, still not associated with the traditional parties managing the crisis and
still advocating the batllista welfare state, provided an opportunity to acquire more voter
support. Instead of attacking the traditional parties, Vazquez began to campaign on his

merits and moderation, as advised by Seregni in 1996. He announced his intention to
appoint Astori, a critic and moderate who espoused market-based economics, as his
minister of economics. This choice communicated that the party was not out of touch —

the Frente Amplio knew market-based economics was the reality of the times, but
intended to fold that into a revised and reorganized paternal and welfare state structure
with which Uruguay was familiar.®?

The 2004 elections showed the extent to which Uruguayans believed in the
change proposed by the Frente Amplio. Vazquez took a majority of votes, with 50.5% of

the total vote and making a runoff unnecessary. The party also claimed more than half of
the seats in both legislative chambers. The Colorados, who had been in the presidency

during the crisis, had the worst electoral showings in their history, with only 10.4% of the
vote.

*

Not

only

was

the

Frente

% Altman, Castiglioni, & Luna, 155, 159-160.
» Corte Electoral, “Elecciones Nacionales 2004.”

Amplio

victorious,

it

was

decisively

so.
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The one exception Asamblea Uruguay led by Danilo Astori, supported Vazquez’s
politics. 84 However, this unanimity carried with it the temptation to create an “us versus
them” mindset, Vazquez against Asamblea Uruguay and its sympathizers. If Vazquez
began to speak out against Asamblea Uruguay and Astori, the definition of the “left” as a
cohesive

party

would

lose consistency

and threaten

its electoral

success.°°

Seregni

bemoaned the politics of confrontation emerging within the party, calling for a return to

the “intelligent opposition” policy that had led the Frente Amplio to such success.*°
Vazquez managed to negotiate compromises without splitting the coalition, and
Astori’s sector of the party remained within the Frente Amplio coalition. In the 1999
elections, Vazquez

as the Frente Amplio

presidential candidate took the most votes,

39.1%, but in the run-off lost to the Colorado candidate, as was planned with the electoral
reform of 1996. The party did, however, gain majorities in both legislative chambers.*”
This success led the Nuevo Espacio party, another leftist coalition, to join the Frente
Amplio coalition in 2002, and the party was renamed Encuentro Progresista — Frente
Amplio — Nueva Mayoria, or EP-FA-NM.*8

Leading to victory

The 2001 economic crisis gave the Frente Amplio to distinguish themselves from
the failures of the traditional parties. Uruguay’s economic crisis, set off by the 1999
devaluation of the Brazilian real and the 2001 Argentine crisis, caused unemployment to
skyrocket, and Uruguayans of all classes suffered. The alternative economic policies of

* Pereira 13/12/96, 5.
* Pereira 13/12/96, 3-6.
*° Cesin, Nelson. “Un error histérico que el FA va a pagar.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 13 Dec 1996. 6.
*” Corte Electoral, “Elecciones Nacionales 1999,”
88 Partido Nuevo Espacio. “Nuestro Partido.” 2009. <http://www.nuevoespacio.org.uy/partido.php>.
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Chapter 3: Party politics and shifts in ideology
The
dictatorship

Frente
in 1984

Amplio’s

emergence

as a significant party

created a situation in which

the Blanco

after the end
and

of the

Colorado

parties’

constituencies threatened to switch parties to this new major party. The threat of losing
voters caused both traditional parties to respond with ideological shifts to capture a
greater portion of the electorate in response to the left’s appeal to a broad base of
Uruguayans. The Blanco and Colorado parties also began to work together more and
more over time, significant for two parties with a history of constant conflict. Their
cooperation was imperative for a Blanco or Colorado government to be effective or to be
able to pass legislation, as the Frente Amplio’s growing representation gave them more
and

more

control

over

the

legislative

chambers

as well

as possibilities

to

block

presidential action.

1980-1984: The end of the dictatorship
In 1980, the military’s lack of legitimacy among the people was exposed, forcing
them to begin the process of reinstituting the political parties. That year, military leaders
had attempted to institutionalize the power they had been exercising since the coup in
1973 by writing a new constitution to ensure continued military control and restriction of
rights, but the measure was voted down by popular vote, with only 42% of votes in
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favor.”' The defeat forced the military to allow the political parties to have legal
primaries to select new leaders in hopes that pro-military fractions and ideologies would
win

and

allow

the

military

to use

political

parties

to mediate

the

process

of

institutionalizing power. The dictatorship did not allow the Frente Amplio to take part in
these primaries and the coalition’s leaders remained in exile.”
Unfortunately for the military, the primaries resulted in victories for the party

fractions that held true to pre-dictatorship ideologies rather than for the fractions that
supported a continued dictatorship. 70% of Colorados and 78% of Blancos voted for anti-

military fractions within their respective parties. The Blancos experienced the most
fervent return to anti-military ideologies, with 49% of the vote going to the most radical
fractions of the party.”? Some of this support came from voters who normally would have
supported the still-proscribed Frente Amplio

but instead were forced to bolster the

fractions of the traditional parties who showed the most opposition to the military.”"
The struggle to put an end to the military dictatorship and bring democracy back
to Uruguay initially caused an alignment of the Blanco and Colorado parties to create a
more powerful opposition to the military as they slowly regained their rights. After the
dictatorship rehabilitated the parties for the primaries, ideological differences were put
aside in favor of a joint effort for a return to democracy. Blancos and Colorados came
together in negotiations with the military in 1983 to reject any authoritarian plans. This
rejection led the military to shift from finding ways to maintain power to finding the

* De Brito, Alexandra Barahona. “Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America.” Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997. 69; Altman 2008, 503.

» Caetano and Rilla, 94; De Brito, 69, 70.

3 De Brito, 70.
*4 Gillespie, Charles Guy. “Democratic Consolidation in Uruguay.” Elites and Democratic Consolidation in
Latin America and Southern Europe. Eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992. pp 178-207. 185.
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“best exit” from authoritarianism. The two parties also joined with the left to refuse to
participate in any elections until civil rights had been re-established, leaders had been

taken out of exile, and parties had been reinstated. The Multipartidaria was created to
coordinate party activity against the dictatorship.”°
Fundamental ideological differences still existed and differences in strategy for
the negotiation of a return to democracy and the actual governing of the transition process

ended the cooperation. The question of strategy for Uruguay’s transition to democracy
began

to form

divisions both between

parties as well as internally.

The

Colorados

withdrew from the Multipartidaria in 1984 in protest of the social mobilization and
strikes, ending the period of overt cooperation between all parties. ”°
Colorados believed in elite-led transition and compromise to reach a reinstatement
of democracy.

Despite their involvement with the left and social movements

during

protests in 1983, the Colorados wanted a transition led by negotiation between military
leaders

and

moderation

party
and

leaders,

compromise,

not

broad

mobilization,

not revenge

and

a solution

against the dictatorship.’”

tempered
The

with

Colorados

wanted to negotiate with the military even before the regime fully reinstated rights. Party
leader Julio Maria Sanguinetti believed that if the military was willing to give guarantees
of democracy and freedom, then the party only could or should ask for negotiations and
nothing more. ”°
The Blancos split internally over the transition strategy, with some supporting the
Colorado

°>
°6
*”
*8

plan

and

others

following

De Brito, 70-71; Caetano and Rilla, 110.
De Brito, 72; Caetano and Rilla, 112.
Caetano and Rilla, 112.
De Brito, 72; Caetano and Rilla, 112.

an

ideology

and

strategy

centered

on

social
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mobilization and defense of rural ranching interests against commercial

and urban

interests.’ The part of the party against the Colorado plan tended to follow the radical
ideas of Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, an exiled Blanco leader. Ferreirista Blancos held that

negotiation

with the military was

Ultimately,

Ferreira

wanted

necessary but only from

“outright

capitulation

of the

a position

military

of strength.

regime,

and

the

transformation of the Blanco party from a conservative antistate intervention, rather rural
party of notable into a mass movement of loyal followers with populist, libertarian,
nationalist, and even democratic socialist strands.”!°° Ferreira’s plan was to reach out to
the still-banned left, especially the Frente Amplio, to strengthen social mobilization. The
party

moved

away

from

the

fractions

in line with the

Colorados

and

depended

increasingly on Ferreira for guidance and strategy. This became a problem when, in 1983,
the military did not allow Ferreira to return from exile due to his radical ideology.'°!
Negotiations with the military concerning the return to democracy and struggles

between the traditional parties created an opportunity for the Frente Amplio to become a
legitimate party. The traditional parties’

struggle for dominance

began to center on

forcing the Frente Amplio to align with one of the traditional parties to tip the popular
vote in that party’s favor. The Blancos were cultivating links to counteract the Colorados’
dominance in the popular vote. The Colorados searched for a way to break the alliance

and seized on the Frente Amplio’s desire for independence from the traditional parties
and for recognition as a legitimate party. Knowing that the party was already taking steps
away from its guerrilla beginnings and towards political action as the only course of
* Gillespie, Charles Guy. “Democratic Consolidation in Uruguay.” Elites and Democratic Consolidation in
Latin America and Southern Europe. Eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992. pp 178-207. 180.

100 Gillespie, 185.

'°! De Brito, 72.
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action, the Colorados wanted to encourage the Frente Amplio to become moderate in
exchange for inclusion in the system.'
The military’s reluctance to work with the Blanco party created an opportunity for
the Frente Amplio to strengthen its position, and the dictatorship took steps to make the
Frente Amplio a legal party again. They released its leader Liber Seregni from jail in
March

1984. Later, threatened by Ferreira’s possible return to Uruguay, the military

recognized

the Frente

Amplio

as a legitimate

political

party

in June

1984.

When

negotiations between the military and political parties began in July 1984, the Colorados
and the Frente Amplio, not the Blancos, entered the discussions.
!°°
During

the negotiations, the fractions who

had won

the primaries

and

built

support within each party were the fractions whose plans were put into action. The
Colorados still espoused an elite-led transition and government and eventually secured it
with a compromise with the military to end the dictatorship period. The Blancos spent the
negotiation period attempting to mobilize the population, demonstrating their belief in a
more

broadly

based

idea of government.

The

Frente Amplio’s

ideology

was

more

complicated, but most of the frenteamplistas were in favor of any transition negotiated
with the military so that they could become a part of the new system.'” A 1984 poll

showed that 80% of Frente Amplio political leaders believed that social mobilization
should continue but that elite negotiations were the key to a successful transition.
!°°

102 De Brito 72-73, Caetano and Rilla 113-116.
103 Caetano and Rilla, 116-123.
104 Caetano and Rilla, 125-128.

195 Gillespie, 192.
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1985-1990: Transition presidency
During the presidential campaigns for the 1984 election, the parties emphasized
their differences,

traditional

ending

parties’

Blanco

solidarity

and

with

Colorado

their

cooperation

beliefs

for the time

evidenced

itself

being.

when

the

The

same

constituencies voted for each party they had voted for prior to the dictatorship. The actual
transition process during the 1985 to 1990 period, however, motivated a re-establishment

of the cooperation between the Blancos and Colorados, causing an ideological shift in
those two parties. 52.2%
successful transition would

of Blanco

political leaders polled in 1985

be led by party elites, while only 30%

believed that a
still believed in

Ferreira’s popular transition.'”°
Uruguay’s first presidential elections since 1971 took place in November

1984,

and the demographics of the election results indicated that public perception of each party
had not changed. The Colorados’ 40% of the vote to the Blancos’ 34% won Julio Maria
Sanguinetti the presidency and gave them a majority in both the Senate and the Chamber
of Deputies.'°’ The demographics

of party support had changed

little since the last

elections, in 1971.'°* The Colorado Party maintained a varied voter base, faring a little
better among

urban voters and more-educated

voters than others. The

Blancos

had

campaigned largely on the fact that they had not been part of the agreement with the
military,

presenting

historically

the

themselves

champions

as

of the

an
rural

alternative
areas

and

to

the
with

Colorados.~°
their

109

emphasis

The

party,

on

social

106 Gillespie, 187.

197 Corte Electoral, “Elecciones Nacionales 1984.”
'8 Dutrénit Bielous, Silvia. “Del consenso transpartidario al acuerdo blanquicolorado.” Secuencia: Revista
de Historia y Ciencias Sociales. Vol. 44, pp. 73-96. 1999. 75.
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mobilization over elite-led movements,

maintained a solid base in less industrialized

regions, but did lose support across all regions.!!°
Sanguinetti

used

strengthen the Colorado

the

transition

period

Party’s position.

to consolidate

executive

power

and

First, he settled issues that had not been

resolved in the negotiations: he liberated all political prisoners, removed all restrictions
on parties, and abolish nearly all of the military government’s decrees.''' He handled
every crisis as if it could lead to another dictatorship, which, he hoped, would strengthen
democracy, enhance executive power, and establish the Colorado Party as the party of
civilian rule.'"? Sanguinetti

also revived the “blanquicolorado” cooperation over key

issues such as amnesty for members of the dictatorship and the functioning of the party
system!"

The

issue of amnesty

for the military was the best example

of Blanco

and

Colorado cooperation in the 1985 to 1990 period. For the Blancos, support for amnesty
was the biggest ideological shift they could have undertaken. To support amnesty for the

military was a huge change from Ferreira’s original hard line toward the dictatorship,
shown by Blanco refusal to participate in negotiations. In agreeing with the Colorado
party, Ferreira stated “We
foundation of revenge,”

all know...that this country cannot build a future on a

denying that prosecuting human

rights violations would

be

healthy for the new democracy.''4 When the Frente Amplio began to oppose amnesty, it

110 Mieres, Pablo. “Partidos Politicos y cuerpo electoral: Las elecciones de 1984.” Cuadernos del CLAEH.
Vol. 12, No. 4, pp 19-36. 1987. 27.

‘11 Gillespie, 195.

112 Dutrénit, 84-87.
113 Gillespie, 199.
114 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson. Quote from Gutiérrez et al, Uruguay. 1989. 27-28.
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served to cement the accord between the traditional parties by giving them common
opposition.
The process of securing amnesty showed the level of cooperation present between
the Blancos and Colorados. The elite style of government endorsed by the Colorados
became a part of the Blanco plan as well — punishment for violations was only discussed
with a small group of politicians and the cooperation between the two parties kept the
Frente Amplio

from opening

the discussions up to all. When

the law was

finally

presented to the legislative chambers, fractions of both traditional parties united with the
Frente Amplio

in an attempt to defeat it, surprisingly including the fraction of the

National Party most closely associated with Ferreira. Opposition was too scarce to
overcome the blanquicolorado agreement and the law was passed.’
The blanquicolorado agreement became a central part of managing

the party

system to allow stabilization of the new democracy. Ferreira stated that the Blanco party
would

step back

Sanguinetti’s
Colorado

opposition to Colorado

policies.

conservatism,

The

Frente

Amplio

plans and facilitate legislative passage
shifted into the space

of opposition

of
to

while the Blancos began to align more with the Colorados,

occasionally oscillating between the two.!!®

1990-1995: Blanco victory
The Blancos won the 1989 presidential elections but maintained the coalition with
the Colorados. The new president Luis Alberto Lacalle, grandson of Luis Alberto de
Herrera, had campaigned on a platform of stability and combating inflation. Scholars,

15 Dutrénit, 75-82.

116 Gillespie, 203.
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however, contribute his victory above all to the fact that parties charged with restoring

democracy, regardless of how they perform, are generally rewarded with electoral defeat
in the next election.''? Economic issues also played a central role during the Sanguinetti
administration, as the military dictatorship had left behind a laundry list of economic
complications. Unresolved economic complications were also blamed for the Colorado
loss in the 1989 elections. !!®

Lacalle entered a coalition with the Colorados in order to govern. He had only
garnered 22% of the popular vote and only 57% support in his own party, which would
put up some of the staunchest opposition to his economic plans.''’ Lacalle and his
fraction did not have much support in the parliament either — his parliamentary support is
described

as

“scraggly”

blanquicolorado

and

cooperation

requiring

a miracle

in a government

to

expand.'”?

that Brecha

Lacalle

-- a weekly

pursued

Uruguayan

political magazine -- consistently described as a “coalition.”
Lacalle’s difficulties in keeping the Colorados in the coalition showed that the
Blancos were becoming the extreme right in politics, not the Colorados. Often, neither
the Frente Amplio nor the Colorados would join with his government, stating that they
wanted to remain on the left and center, respectively. The Blancos had clearly undergone
a major shift in ideology, moving from a center-left ideology to become so conservative

''7 Riz, Liliana de and Catalina Smulovitz. “Instauracién democratica y reforma politica en Argentina y
Uruguay.” /beroamericana América Latina-Espafia-Portugal. Vol. 18, Nos. 1-2. 1992. 199.
'I8 Vacs, Aldo C. “Between Restructuring and Impasse: Liberal Democracy, Exclusionary Policy Making,
and Neoliberal Policies in Argentina and Uruguay.” Deepening Democracy in Latin America. Eds. Kurt
von Mettenheim and James Malloy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. pp. 137-172. 144.

119 Riz and Smulovitz, 200.
120 Nahoum, Benjamin. “Las viviendas bajo el gobierno de Lacalle.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 5 Jan

1990. 8.
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that the original conservative party, the Colorados, would not even agree with their
plans.'7!
In January

1990, Lacalle’s government was being hailed as a grand change,

although writers hesitated to label the change positive or negative. An article published in
Brecha in January stated that the people had voted in a Blanco president in order to

change their situations, whether it be income, unemployment, or inflation, but reserved
judgment on whether or not Lacalle would be capable of bringing about change.'”
Brecha also stated that regardless of the number of parties participating in the elections,
“only two parties exist, on one side the party for advancement and progress, on the other
the party for immobilization and reaction.”'? However, the author did not mean the
Blancos were the party for progress; instead, the author of the article believed that the
Blanco victory opened up an opportunity for the left to enter.
The Blancos continued to move to align with the Colorados so that the Frente
Amplio stood in opposition to the traditional parties that were linked together in program
and idea. Lacalle’s economic plans continued the Colorado plans from 1985 to 1990 and
took them

even

farther,

so much

so that they were too neoliberal

for the Colorado

Party.!7* Lacalle promised “economic adjustment” to rid Uruguay of its inflation and
deficit. The adjustment was created with the help of the World Bank and was in line with
policies previously pursued by Sanguinetti, who

had also worked

with international

institutions. The adjustment would consist of reduction of expenditure and increase of

"21 Castiglioni, Rossana. The Politics of Social Policy Change in Chile and Uruguay: Retrenchment Versus
Maintenance, 1973-1998. New York: Routledge, 2005. 75.
!22 Rodriguez, Hector. “Algo mas sobre un gobierno de coalicién.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 5 Jan

1990. 6.
!23 Bruschera, Oscar H. “El espacio de cambio.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 5 Jan 1990. 4.
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income, all through a drastic increase of sales taxes, an increase in retirement investment

resulting in an indirect decrease in salaries, and a decrease in jobs available in the
government.”
Lacalle’s approach to adoption of the adjustment showed a shift from traditional
Blanco ideology to that of the Colorados’ elite-led ideas. The World Bank would be
contributing US$105 million to the management of several banks, along with their role in
directing the entire adjustment.!”° Despite the massive scope of the project and his own
certainty that it would negatively affect many Uruguayans, Lacalle did not believe that an

agreement with the World Bank needed to be brought before the parliament. His only nod
to the lower classes supposedly championed by the Blancos was to state that the policies
of adjustment would be balanced with social aid programs to ensure that “it would not be
the smallest salary or the most vulnerable citizen who would carry the heaviest weight of
the new economic policy.”!7”
The

adjustment

proved

to be one of the worst and most heavily

criticized

decisions of the Lacalle administration and gave leftist parties a chance to oppose the

traditional parties’ disastrous ideas. Danilo Astori, a high profile member of the left, used
his critique of the adjustment to lump the two traditional parties together in failure. He
implied that the Blancos were making the same mistakes made by the Colorados and
foreign institutions, assuming that all Uruguayans were equal and taking no steps to

shield the lower economic classes from the force of an adjustment.’*”

128

Other critics agreed

"5 Blixen, Samuel. “El precio de la paz neoliberal.” Brecha. Montevideo, Uruguay. 9 Feb 1990. 7.
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16 Feb 1990. 11.
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that an economic adjustment needed to be made, but disagreed with Lacalle’s plan. Hugo
Batalla, senator from the Gobierno del Pueblo party, believed that the mechanisms of
adjustment chosen were those that were most likely to cause conflict by taking money out
of salaries

and

raising

prices

of consumer

items.'””

The

adjustment

was

largely

responsible for the Colorado withdrawal from the coalition, more problems with labor,
and the Frente Amplio’s abandonment of any cooperation with the Blancos.'*”
Lacalle began to allow foreign private investment when the banks became

a

problem, stepping even further away from Blanco ideology. The state banks, newly
nationalized with US$400 million, had to be re-privatized. Leaders of the banks, chosen
by the World Bank in the first place, sought foreign investors to buy them, a swerve away
from the Blanco ideological goal of a Uruguay for Uruguayans. The $400 million was
lost to the Uruguayan government, only $50 million of which had come from the World
Bank.'?! It became evident that Lacalle did not intend to change anything about the elite
style or the economic plans of the Colorado government under Sanguinetti.
Lacalle’s approach to the armed forces, police, and national defense

caused

criticism as well and evidenced that he was moving the party toward Colorado ideology
and programs in more than just the economic sector. A debate over whether former
members of the dictatorship should be completely pardoned and allowed to serve in
leadership began — Lacalle stated that he was in favor of a pardon along with the
Colorados under Sanguinetti, despite the fact that most Blanco senators were against it.3?

29 Batalla, Hugo. Interview with Roger Rodriguez. “Se prepar6 para ganar, no para gobernar.” Brecha.
Montevideo, Uruguay. 2 Mar 1990. 6.
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Lacalle’s candidate
participation

in

for leadership of the Air Force would
the

dictatorship

and

economic

crimes

need

a pardon

committed

both

for

during

the

dictatorship.'*? In a decidedly elite-centered view of government, the president did not
think that the public needed to have his support of the pardons explained. Critics believed
that the public indeed had a right to know what criteria their president would use to
decide who would lead the armed forces after only five years of restored democracy. 134
Lacalle’s plans for maintaining the social peace within the country displayed a
Colorado-style focus on security over social welfare, as well as a startling disregard for
the tenuousness of the new democracy. Lacalle saw a need for plans to preserve social
peace, expecting disturbances to arise from the difficulties inherent in the economic
adjustment. His plans included outfitting the armed forces with equipment to handle
“unconventional conflicts” within the country and increasing the defense budget for the
police. However, there existed almost no separation between the police and armed forces;

in the event that the police were overwhelmed by an internal conflict, the armed forces
could step in, using any budget money allotted for themselves or the police.'** Obviously,
these plans seemed to bolster the armed forces, recently the perpetrators of 11 years of
repression, and made the Uruguayan people extremely nervous. Critics also pointed out
that Lacalle, in his February 2 interview in Brecha, had stated his goal was to dedicate
52% of the budget to social projects, something nearly impossible given that the defense
budget

he

inherited

was

already

40%

of the total budget

and

would

not

augmentation of police funding and social funding.’ 6

133 Blixen, 9 Feb 90, 7.
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Lacalle’s social projects and budget were failures. On some problems, such as
housing, Lacalle’s program
During his campaign,

was a confused mixture of Blanco and Colorado

Lacalle had promised

to establish a Ministry

ideals.

of Housing

to

alleviate the housing problem, in keeping with the Blanco focus on less-fortunate groups

in society. However, he developed no plan of who would serve in this position, what their
duties would be, and how much money would be invested for use in housing. Blancos
appeared to be turning more toward the elite and middle class focus of the Colorados:
Lacalle had been one of those warring against any laws for state help to tenants, and also
promised to make rental real estate entirely free market. Uruguayans accustomed to the
batllista style of government and high levels of state intervention did not want the
reaction to a housing crisis to be Jess intervention — the Blanco party’s plan surprised
them.
'37

Social security and education were other social problems

in which

Lacalle

attempted to implement Colorado-style policies. The social security problem required
balancing demands from workers with the budget deficit. Lacalle’s answer was to limit
payouts and raise retirement age, the exact same approach used by Sanguinetti, but the
approach failed without any support from Blanco fractions, the left, and some Colorado
fractions. In the education sector, Lacalle’s administration simply built off of previous
Colorado reforms of the system, changing little about Sanguinetti’s original efforts. '**
A final blow to the lower economic classes and the old populist Blanco ideology

was Lacalle’s decision to regulate strikes. Previously, Sanguinetti had intervened in labor
disputes on the side of employers, and workers hoped that the Blancos with their broader

137 Nahoum, 8.
138 Castiglioni, 64-65, 70.
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social base would help them, especially given Lacalle’s planned economic adjustment.
However, Lacalle had decided to exercise the state’s constitutional right to determine
what action was legal without state consent and to regulate strikes. He also signaled his
intent to regulate action taken by employers,

all in an effort to limit any panic or

exaggerated responses to the adjustment.'*°
In short, Lacalle’s presidency was a more disastrous version of Sanguinetti’s

1985-1990 presidency. The Blancos had been forced to link their program, ideological
goals, and style of government to that of the Colorados, cementing the blanquicolorado
cooperation and keeping the left firmly in its position as opposition to both traditional
parties. The complete exclusion of the left in all agreements and negotiations led Liber
Seregni

to dub

the

government

not a national

government

but

a blanquicolorado

government that did not properly represent the people. Seregni went on to state that the
system was “the famous bipartisan system...in a new form.”!°

1995-2000: Solidification of the blanquicolorado agreement
During

Sanguinetti’s

second

presidency

from

1995-2000,

the

Blancos

and

Colorados ideologically converged even more, eliminating many separations between the
parties. The system began to look more like a bipartisan system, with the Blancos and
Colorados

on one side, and the Frente Amplio

on the other. Both

social reform

electoral reform passed during this period required the blanquicolorado

and

cooperation.

Sanguinetti was able to successfully address many of the social problems from his first

39 Tacalle, 5.
'40 Seregni, Liber. Interview with Marfa Urruzola. “No es un gobierno nacional.” Brecha. Montevideo,
Uruguay. 2 Mar 1990. 7.
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administration and Lacalle’s presidency, but only with the help of the Blancos.'*! Three

of Sanguinetti’s ministers were Blancos, and the two parties voted together in the Senate
and the Chamber
ideological

of Deputies to pass these various reforms.

alignment,

they were

With

cooperation

able to resolve social security, education,

and

and the

reduction of state employment.'” The electoral reform, however, most clearly showed

the solidarity between the two traditional parties fomented by the threat of a victorious
left.
The presence of the Frente Amplio as a threat to the traditional parties’ success

caused more cooperation in an effort to limit the Frente Amplio’s actions and success.
The left’s electoral power had grown to a formidable size, and the elections of 1994

showed that they were close to toppling the electoral advantage of the other two parties.
The Colorado Party garnered 32.5% of the vote, the Blancos 31.4%, and the Frente
Amplio 30.8%.'”

It was clear that something needed to be done to prevent a

leftist

victory in 1999,
The reform would change the existing system from the double-simultaneous vote
system to a run-off system. In the absence of an absolute majority, the two candidates

with the most votes would enter into a run-off election for the presidency. Fractions
within parties would also no longer be allowed to combine together and share votes to
win representation in the Chamber of Deputies. Finally, elections were split up — instead
of taking place all on the same day, there were four separate days of elections: primaries,

41 Castiglioni, 65-68, 72.
2 Nahum, Benjamin. Breve historia del Uruguay independiente. Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda
Oriental, 1999. 194-195.

13 Corte Electoral. “Elecciones Nacionales de 1994.”
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legislative and first-round presidential elections, a run-off if necessary, and municipal
elections. '’
One of the changes in the reform, the banning of multiple candidates per party,
benefitted the left. To acquire enough support to pass the reform, the traditional parties
. had to make a compromise with the left and eliminate the multi-fraction voting lists from
the executive elections. Instead of choosing the winning candidate within the winning
party, each party would

only be allowed to run one candidate, decided during the

primaries. For the traditional parties, this would be a huge change, but the left had always
run only one candidate for the presidency.'
Despite Blanco and Colorado cooperation and concessions made to the left, the

reform barely passed. As a major constitutional change, the reform had to be approved
directly by the people through a

plebiscite, held in December 1996.'*° Only 52.2% of

those voting approved the changes, and the reform barely scraped its way

into the

constitution.
!4”

The run-off elections were put in place to ensure that in the event that the Frente
Amplio

candidate

made

it to the run-offs, the traditional party voters would

come

together and vote for whichever party was in the run-off, effectively blocking the Frente
Amplio from the presidency. The run-offs also made the blanquicolorado agreement even
more necessary and inevitable, since the parties would need to share voters and keep
coalition governments. Keeping ideology stable and in line with past programs was no

'44 Cason 2002, 97.

145 Cason 2002, 97.
146 Cason 2002, 97.
147 Altman 2008, 504.
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longer the focus of Blanco and Colorado action, but rather keeping themselves in power
with any coalitions or compromises necessary had become more important. '*®

2000-2005: Challenges to the traditional parties
The

period

from 2000

to 2005

saw the decline of the two

traditional parties,

beginning with the difficulty in winning the 1999 election. The Blancos and Colorados
united their vote to win the presidency, via the electoral changes made with the 1996
reform. The first round of presidential elections in 1999 resulted in a victory for the
Frente Amplio, which was hindered from taking office by the new run-off elections
instituted by the 1996 electoral reform. The Frente Amplio came away from the elections

with 39% of the vote to the Colorados’ 32% and the Blancos’ 21.7%. While some Blanco
voters did support the Frente Amplio in the run-off, the majority supported the Colorado
party, as planned, and Jorge Batlle was elected president with 52.5% of the vote!"
Their cooperation began to crack as a result of Batlle’s responses to the economic
crisis that began in 1999 and intensified in 2002. Confronted with an economic crisis
instigated by Brazilian and Argentine instability and failures, Batlle responded with
neoliberal economic measures very similar to those of Blanco president Lacalle. His plan
for financial

and

economic

recovery

included

deregulation,

privatization,

structural

adjustments, and aid from the IMF and World Bank.!°Gerardo Caetano, a Uruguayan
political science analyst, describes Batlle’s economic policies as a negative movement

away from batllismo, which had created “equality of opportunities” and a “hyper-

48 Nahum, 196.
149 Corte Electoral, “Elecciones Nacionales 1999,”
'50 Tnter-Parliamentary Union. “Uruguay.”
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integrated society.” Caetano also asserted that Batlle’s pursuit of market-based politics
had effectively destroyed the batllista system, |*!
The

batllista program,

initially created

by a Colorado,

was

almost

entirely

neglected by the party in favor of more conservative social programs and neoliberal

economic plans. Social programs under Batlle were nothing like those of his predecessor,
Batlle y Orddfiez. The percentage of children in poverty skyrocketed, as did the dropout
rate and teenage pregnancy rate. Existing programs targeted the elderly rather than the
youth and did nothing to address these growing problems. Batlle’s administration was
able to adequately address health issues, but did nothing to offset the inequality created
by the rolling back of the old social welfare system. The problems mounted to the point
that the Blancos, against the blanquicolorado agreement, began to occasionally dissent
with the Colorado party.'™
The Blancos’ tentative withdrawal from the blanquicolorado cooperation signaled
that the party was considering a move back to an opposition position.

While

their

ideological goals did not change, their new willingness to oppose the Colorados in the
legislative body revealed that the party was considering a shift back to the center-left
ideology originally espoused before the blanquicolorado agreement. No definite action
was

taken

in this

period,

however,

and

the

Blancos’

position

with

regards

to the

Colorados would not be apparent until the campaigns for the 2004 election.!*?
The Frente Amplio’s emergence as the guardians of batllismo further damaged
Batlle’s standings in public opinion and subsequently the Colorados’

chances for an

! Caetano, Gerardo. “Uruguay 2003. Agobios y desafios del ‘nuevo pats’.” Nueva Sociedad. 2003. No.

184. pp 14-24. 15-16.

152 Caetano 2003, 15-19.
13 Caetano 2003, 20.
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electoral victory in 2004. The Frente Amplio still defended the paternal state and
extensive social programs set up in the early 1900s by Batlle y Ordéfiez, and intended to
prioritize social efforts to respond to current problems.

Conversely,

statements

from

and

'S Caetano 2003, 20, 22

plans

seemed

“far

Jorge Batlle’s
reality.

os

154
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Chapter 4: 2004 party platforms
In 2005, Colorado president Jorge Batlle’s term came to end, and Dr. Tabaré
Vazquez became

the first Frente Amplio president in Uruguay.

The blanquicolorado

agreement had failed to limit leftist power, although both parties knew they were in
danger from the left’s rising popularity. The campaigns leading up to the 2004 election
saw the Blanco and Colorado ideologies continue to converge on certain points, but more
tellingly the programs began to center on responding to the left rather than one another.
The Frente Amplio program, on the other hand, focuses on the incorporation of batllismo,
updating it to respond to new challenges to the country. Economic plans, social programs,
government

reform,

and

national

security

plans

from

each

party’s

program

show

ideological alignment most clearly.

Response to the Frente Amplio
The

Colorado

party program

directly attacks the Frente Amplio’s

plans

and

popularity in the beginning of their program. Batlle’s legacy and continued popularity
becomes the Colorados’ weapon against the left’s popularity from the first paragraph of
the party program. The Uruguayan people are asked, “What paths should we follow to
preserve the historic social net created by batllismo...?” and the answer they are clearly
implying is that it should be the paths of the party that created batilismo in the first

—
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place.'** The program takes care to point out Uruguay’s high levels of social expenditure
and its characterization as a benefactor state or welfare state. The credit for the exit from

the 2002 economic crisis is given to batllismo. Finally, the Colorados claim that the very
“spirit of solidarity that permeates the Uruguayan state is a result of batllismo and not of
socialist conceptions,”!°°

The Colorado Party attempts to make the idea of right and left in politics sound
antiquated and against academic progress. The giant steps in science and technology
made in the late 20" and early 21“ century yield right versus left “a false dichotomy.” In

an effort to downplay the blanquicolorado agreement, the program states that the left is
not fighting a “monolithic right” and to imply the existence of such a group is an error.'*”
The document points out that the Uruguayan general budget, still structured on batllista
lines, already includes a 68% expenditure on social programs and is considered a

liberal

or social-democratic structure by European and United States standards. Finally, the party
claims to not identify itself using “electoral profiles or publicity positions.”!> 8
Strangely enough, after rejecting right and left labels, the Colorados turn to attack
the Frente Amplio as the left, on par with Eastern Europe and Cuba. The Frente Amplio
is characterized as a leftist party that is only efficient as opposition, not capable of

governing or handling actual crises. When presented with problems, the Colorados argue,
the left has no answers, and can only win when they do not win electorally. History and
the reality of governing a country leaves the “’old’ left drained of content.”!°?
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The Blanco Party does not name the Frente Amplio or the left in its program, but

it does insinuate its ownership of some of the principles espoused by the Frente Amplio.
The Declaration of Principles states that the party developed the concept of a coalition.
The Blancos
vaguely

also claim

insinuating

they

liberty, justice, and democracy
hold

them

higher

than

any

as their “supreme”
other

party

values,

historically

or

presently. |

Economic plans
For the 2005 election, Uruguay’s precarious economic situation made any party’s
economic plans central to its success in the election. Uruguay had suffered an economic
crisis in 2002, along with other countries in the region, leaving the country with massive

foreign debt and uncertainty on how to pay it off. All three parties address debt servicing
and economic growth — however, the Colorados and Blancos employ neoliberal strategies
and greater reliance on external investment and foreign aid, while the Frente Amplio
promotes competition through reform of the batilista welfare state without a complete
change and a moving away from reliance on other countries.
According to the Colorado party program, the Uruguayan economy in 2004 was
ready to grow at 4% or more a year. To achieve this aim, the Colorados’ program adopts
a neoliberal approach to the economy and drops the old batlilista goals, stating that a
welfare state is no longer a viable strategy but promising to avoid total dependence on the
market. The party tries to explain this approach as a reform of batilismo, not a new plan

'© Partido Nacional. “Declaracién de Principios.” 2001. Edited 2002, 2006. 6.
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or a dismantling of the old, and maintains that its priority is protecting the weakest
sectors of society through a continued batllista welfare model.'*!
Several plans are central to the achievement of 4% growth. Uruguay’s growth is
to be couched in a strengthening of the original agro-industrial economy

but largely

spurred by growth in the technological and information sector. To address the existing

budget deficit, a GDP surplus is to be maintained every year. The party promises to
increase employment to bring the unemployment rate to its lowest point in history. The

tax system is to be simplified to become a greater tax on “unproductive capital” without
heavily

taxing

the means

of production

key to growth

and to encourage

external

investment in the country. MERCOSUR is to be the focal point of the economy, but other
commercial agreements were to be worked out. Industry is to be opened to increase
competitiveness, with especially care to privatize energy. Exports are to increase through
opening markets, allowing the exchange rate to float, and keeping state intervention to a
minimum.!”

The Blanco party also signals its new neoliberal leanings. The Declaration of
Principles

describes

how

the economy

in the last few decades

has been

naturally

changing, moving away from state responsibilities of the old system to a market-based
system of creation and distribution of goods and services. They indicate the need “to find
a new equilibrium among individual, community, and state responsibilities.” However,
neoliberal plans are carefully couched in language about protecting “the most vulnerable

sectors of the society,” in keeping with the historic Blanco focus on the rural poor.!®

161 partido Colorado, 4-5, 9.
82 partido Colorado, 4-5, 12-14, 26-29, 83-84.
168 partido Nacional, 6-8.
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Economic policy is geared toward scaling back the state’s role in the economy
through various plans. The plan calls for avoiding monopolies, public or private, and the
establishment of the state as simply the guide to the private sector. The state is also to
protect property rights, open the economy to greater competition, and increase foreign

investment. The state bank, as well as another state bank set up for aid with housing, is to
be put on equal footing as its private competitors to increase efficiency and competition.
Greater economic integration through regional and sub-regional economic agreements,
MERCOSUR obviously included, is also mentioned.!™

The Frente Amplio, in its program written by current president Tabaré Vazquez,
also acknowledges the growing power of market mechanisms, but has no intention of
turning its back on batillismo. Its general plan is to “reorganize [Uruguay’s] economy,
improve its state, [and] establish clear rules for the roles played by the state and the
market.”

It also proposes

economic

growth through promotion

of the technological

economy, especially in MERCOSUR.'®
The focus of the Frente Amplio’s economic plans is to put the economy to work
for Uruguayans instead of putting Uruguayans to work for the economy — as Vazquez
says, “macroeconomic stability should be at the service of growth and equality, and not
vice versa.” Standards of competition should be set that best serve both businessmen and
the society at large. New jobs should be generated but the party plans to take care that
these are high quality jobs, not just any jobs. Monetary policies and exchange

rate

policies should be consistent, beneficial for growth, and help to increase equality of

64 Dartido Nacional, 7-8; “Programa de Gobierno del Partido Nacional.”
<www.uruguaytotal.com/elecciones/partido_nacional.htm>. 6-8.
6 Vazquez, Dr. Tabaré. “El gobierno del cambio: La transicién responsable.” Encuentro ProgresistaFrente Amplio-Nueva Mayoria. July/Oct 2004. 7.
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income distribution. The party is firmly in favor of “de-dollarization” of the economy,
turning away from a reliance on foreign economies, although it does recognize the role
international financial organizations could play in social expenditures.
The deficit is to be cut by a more efficient and equitable tax system, social

spending better targeted to priority areas and investment in the public, and increased
exports as well as internal demand for products. However, the Frente Amplio does not
see the deficit as a reason to decrease the state’s role, but calls for an “authentic reform”
geared toward solving problems concerning resources and high costs of public services
and capable of creating new opportunities for employment. The economy will no longer
be solely agricultural but should expand in technological sectors and tourism. Finally,
regional integration is important, leaving behind Uruguay’s economic isolationism and
embracing MERCOSUR along with other agreements. |

Although clear similarities show up in all three parties’ economic plans, the
Blanco and Colorado plans differ from the frenteamplista plan. MERCOSUR is a central
figure for all three, as is further regional integration beyond MERCOSUR. Expansion of
technological services and production also figures into all three plans, as does expansion
of exports. However, the Colorados and Blancos are decidedly more neoliberal than the

Frente Amplio, although they try to cover this tendency with old rhetoric about Batlle or
social justice. Both call for a diminished state role, taking the form of privatization,
greater competition, a larger role for the private sector, and decreased state spending.

Both traditional parties also call for more foreign investment and intervention in the
economy.

166 Vazquez, 8-11.
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The Frente Amplio, meanwhile,

turns inward for solutions to the deficit, rather

than to the dollar and foreign investment in companies. While it does not reject the need
for competition, it does reject the need for an overhaul of the current economic system.

Social spending, income distribution equality, and a state economic presence are still a
part of the new “productive Uruguay” for the Frente Amplio. Privatization is not even
addressed.

Social programs

Changes in economic plans due to budget deficit issues meant that Uruguay’s
massive social welfare state would need to change. In 2004, 68% of the total budget was
social spending, and 30% of all economic activity was public expenditure. To service a
debt, the expenditures associated with the existing welfare state would have to decrease
or change in some way. The Colorados propose an administrative reform as well as a
redefined role for the state. The Blancos suggest a new tax system to pay for the social
programs, along with a similarly redefined role for the state. The Frente Amplio focuses
on social spending as the backbone of the success of all other projects, and promotes its
Social Emergency Plan.
For the Colorados, the new social programs focus on greater efficiency in the
welfare system and a

lesser role for the state: rather than the paternal welfare state

envisioned by Batlle, civil society is expected to care for those left behind by the market.
Early on in the document, despite the stated need to reform the existing bafllista welfare
state, they promise to strengthen the social welfare net against “the new challenges of the
social reality,” but strengthening

appears to be synonymous

with paring down

the
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existing system. Direct state investment in social programs diminishes and is diverted to
other state programs. The Colorados seek to eliminate unnecessary jobs and late welfare
aid, and develop

a new

information system to analyze necessity and fulfillment of

services. They also call for new calculations of public expenditure on social programs.

Civil society should fill the void left by a rolling back of state duties, both
financially and in planning. Plans to bolster education involve making preschool for 3year-olds universal, increasing foreign language education, and expanding technological
education and training. Housing problems are resolved by putting people back into
unoccupied houses, making sure houses have basic utilities and transportation available,
and building new houses without a substantial augmentation of cost. The family becomes
the

focal

point

pregnancies,

of social

educate

spending,

parents

on

attempting

their role

to educate

in the

family,

children,
and

lower

create

more

young
work

opportunities for women.'®”
The Blancos’ social plans require the cost to be distributed away from the state,

and diminish the state’s role, much as the Colorados’ plan does. A progressive tax system
distributes social expenditures throughout the society. Social organizations, departmental
governments, and local governments play more important roles in the new social system.
The party promises to focus its efforts on developing policies to increase opportunities
for youth
teaching,

and

improving

education.

Educational

reforms

include

better training for teachers, greater access to schools

better

quality

for the poor,

of

more

financial aid to make schools free, and obligatory attendance in many levels of education,
including industrial and agricultural training. The family is noted as the most important

67 partido Colorado, 49-56, 72.
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unit of society. The Blancos also wish to eradicate gender inequality and generate greater

opportunities for women.'®
The Frente Amplio proposes a Social Emergency Plan. The emergency, according
to the party, is that 30% of the population lives in poverty and 60% of Uruguayans under
18 live in poverty. The plan includes food distribution for people in the highest levels of
poverty as well as pregnant women, children, and other vulnerable groups. This calls not

for a new institution altogether but a reinforcement of an existing welfare structure.
Youth under 18 whose parents already collect unemployment benefits should also receive
benefits, in an effort to redistribute the national income more equitably and to keep poor

children in schools. Families with a total income under the official poverty line receive
direct subsidies to bring their income up to the minimum, which will work in conjunction
with food and education programs to provide more opportunities. The plan also proposes
to offer support to every child under 4 living in poverty and every pregnant mother living
in poverty. It envisions greater equality for women in every aspect of society.
Education programs are central to the plan as well. The Frente Amplio proposes
to universalize primary education as well as access to secondary education from the
primary cycle; increase social protections like transportation, food, and health care for

schoolchildren to avoid desertion; and improve professional and technological instruction
to improve that sector of the economy.

The party also guarantees greater rights for

teachers, including more effective authorities whose decisions are subject to teacher

approval and better training. The Social Emergency Plan will be paid for by the
elimination of unnecessary expenditures, some of which the Frente Amplio characterizes

as “insulting”

in their

168 partido Nacional, 9-11.

superfluous

nature.

The

party

also

promises

to

increase
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transparency and efficiency so that money spent on social programs does not remain
“trapped in bureaucracy.” 169
Education and equality for women appear in all three parties’ social plans, with
relative similarity in the approach to improve the two issues. However, the Colorados and

the Blancos both signal a scaling back of the state’s role in social spending and welfare
programs while the Frente Amplio intends to simply shift spending to more effective
areas and maintain the baftllista state. Colorados and Blancos also both focus on the
family as the focus of social planning — the Frente Amplio does not address the family
directly, but speaks more about benefits for children and households living in extreme

poverty. The Frente Amplio and the Colorados both discuss the need for administrative
reforms of the welfare state and the elimination of superfluous spending, although the

Colorados’ reform intends to replace parts of the state bureaucracies with civil society
organizations while the Frente Amplio does not.

Government reform
For 15 years leading up to the 2005 election, the mayor of Montevideo has been a
frenteamplista, beginning with Vazquez in 1990. During his time in office, Dr. Vazquez
instituted a much more participatory and decentralized style of democracy, and since a
majority of Uruguayan citizens live in Montevideo, many people had been exposed and

become accustomed to this new style. The Colorados and Blancos would have to respond
to this change in their plans for government reform for the 2005 elections.

Colorado plans for government reform promote batilismo on the one side while
completely dismantling it on the other. To support it, the party tries to promote
169 Vazquez, 17-25.
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decentralization and more attention to labor. However, the state-owned companies are to
be opened up to competition, part of the steps to take the economy away from state
monopolies and toward a more neoliberal economic plan. Workers’

rights are to be

maintained while corporatism is eliminated to benefit consumers. Expansion of the use of
technology to maintain better control of expenditures and more transparency to the public
is also mentioned. In answer to the Frente Amplio’s decentralized government strategy,
the Colorados’

program

decrease bureaucracy

and

includes

the decentralization of municipal

allow funds to be more

governments

to

quickly distributed and utilized

properly. The “Fund for Interior Development” approved by the executive would allow
the municipal governments to use funds allocated to them through the fund to directly
develop their region without executive oversight. The process, however, is to be under
strict legal guidelines to be enumerated by the Colorado party but not included in the
program itself. The Colorados also respond to the Frente Amplio’s hold on a broad social
base by supporting greater civil society participation in the government.
!”°
The Blanco party also proposes a more decentralized and transparent form of
government. Responsibilities and resources transfer from the central government to the
departmental and local governments, which are now expected to mete out resources to the
people. By putting authority in local governments’ hands, the party hopes to bridge the
gap between community needs and government response. Decentralization also includes
encouraging greater citizen participation and transparency of the government to yield
accountability, especially in decreasing corruption. The party also guarantees the rights to

organize and strike to the labor movement.'”!

' Partido Colorado, 71-73, 76.
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The

Frente

Amplio

intends

to

continue

developing

the

decentralized

and

participatory structures it began with in Montevideo, stating that it is “necessary to plan,

execute, and evaluate with the population what the principal problems are and the best
policies to prevent and solve them.” The plan calls for development of forums for citizens
to participate in decision-making that will affect the society. Decentralization is necessary

for state action to be effective, to open the system to citizen participation, to include the
rest of the country outside of Montevideo in state action, to govern by local needs rather
than

party

lines,

and

to

properly

distribute

resources.

Existing

institutions

for

decentralization can carry out this process. The plan also calls for the fulfillment of rights
for Uruguayans living abroad, including their right to vote in Uruguayan elections!”
While

all

three

parties

call

for

decentralization,

the

motive

behind

the

decentralization is different. The Frente Amplio details structures to fulfill the batllista
ideal: to promote citizen participation, less party influence on state action, and greater
fulfillment of rights through decentralization. The Colorado and Blanco motivation for
decentralization appears to be to decrease state spending and to respond to the left’s
success in Montevideo. The two traditional parties also intend to maintain party control
over actions taken by the decentralized system.

National security

For a country like Uruguay, national security faces a dual threat: the threat of
another internal takeover like the one seen in 1973 resulting in a military dictatorship,
and the threat of terrorist attacks from abroad, like the ones seen in Madrid and New

York City. The Colorados’ security plans focus on cutting expenditure associated with
'2 Vazquez, 42-45.
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prisons and police, while maintaining armed forces prepared for any internal or external

threat. The Blancos intend to strengthen

police against internal threats and prepare the

armed forces to defend sovereignty an independence. The Frente Amplio places police
action under citizen scrutiny.
For the Colorados, addressing internal national security continues their policies of
cutting state expenditures in response to the deficit. The Colorado program addresses
lowering expenditures on prisoners by expanding the Ministry of the Interior’s duties to
include prevention of social instability and proposing work programs for prisoners. Work
programs would both aid prisoners’ return to society upon release as well as allow profit
to subsidize some of the costs associated with prisons. The program also promises to
explore alternate penalties to reduce prison overpopulation. Interestingly, the Colorados
reject amnesty

as an alternative,

stating that amnesty

is “decidedly

understood

as

inconvenient.” For external security issues, the party wishes to restore confidence in and
respect for the armed forces, commending them for their role in the peaceful transition to
democracy following the dictatorship. The primary external threat, that of terrorism,
requires the armed forces to be ready to analyze any possible threat, prepare the country,
and ideally prevent such a threat. The forces are to be equipped with the best technology

for “these new realities.”'”?
The Blancos address internal security with reforms of the police and prison
system. The party calls for special attention and training to be given to police on due
process and not infringing the rights of the people, while still protecting the people.
Preventive programs, involving multiple branches of the government, would try to lower
crime

rates.

Prison

system

'3 Dartido Colorado, 77-81.

reforms

improve

conditions

for

prisoners,

while

the
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government

searches

for alternative punishments

to lower prison costs. Concerning

external threats, the party reiterates that the defense of national sovereignty and the

avoidance of using force in terrorism are central issues. The party intends to defend
Uruguay’s rights to its land, sea, and air zones. They also plan to equip the armed forces
for better response to conflicts including scenarios involving terrorism.'”*

The Frente Amplio views police as an instrument of the people and an instrument
of democracy.

Without

a properly

functioning

police force, democracy

and

social

harmony are endangered. Their focus, however, is the prevention of crime through better
social programs to eradicate social exclusion and poverty. Police are to be regulated and

reminded of their role in justice. Democracy, according to the party, cannot be properly
executed without an “agile, responsible judicial system that responds to the demand
of...a society conscious of its rights.”!”°
Once again, the Colorados and Blancos show a similar desire to cut expenditures,
this time through alternative punishments and reform of the prison system. However, the
differences

between

concerned

with

each party’s national

maintaining

national

security plan are clear. The

sovereignty

over

Uruguayan

Blancos

territory,

are
while

terrorism does not play a huge role in their policies. Their internal policy seems more
preoccupied with citizens’ rights than police might. The Colorados, on the other hand,
show an alarming tendency to give power to the armed forces. The threat of terrorism
moves them to improve the armed forces’ equipment while they give them basically free

rein within the country in the name of prevention of terrorist acts. They also commend
the armed forces for their role in transitioning back to democracy without mentioning the

' Partido Nacional, 7; “Programa de Gobierno,” 4-5.

"5 Vazquez, 43.
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arm

ed forces’ role in the initial removal of democracy and basic rights. The Frente

Am

plio program is not concerned with external national security,
and views internal

sec urity problems as offshoots of social failures and poverty, a completely different
approach

from

the

traditional
it

arties.
parti
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Conclusion

The Frente Amplio has become an established part of Uruguayan politics. The
7004 election was not merely a one-time protest vote: the Frente Amplio has a base of
supporters that puts the party in a position to gain majorities in upcoming elections. Since

1971, the party has continually grown in its electoral support from 18% to 50% with no
dips or faltering, and there is no reason to believe that support would suddenly collapse.

Most people who voted for the Frente Amplio intend to stay with that party. The Frente
Amplio’s rise broke the chain of Colorado dominance, resulting in dramatically lower
voting support for the Colorados. In the 2004 elections, received the smallest share of

votes in the history of the party — 10.4%.'”° This suggests the Colorados will depend on
cooperation with the Blancos to regain political power.
The success of the Frente Amplio has caused both traditional parties to change
their ideologies. The Blancos, originally center-left champions of the rural poor, are now
better classified as center-right or right, especially if one considers their economic plans.

No longer does guarding the welfare of the less-fortunate and those forgotten in the rural
areas guide Blanco policy. The Colorado party was originally the creator of batllismo,
Uruguayan

social

welfare,

and

an

economy

eee‘NN

® Corte Electoral, “Elecciones Nacionales 2004.”

for

Uruguayans

rather

than

foreign
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companies. Now the Colorado party adopts policy to support foreign loans, trade, and
investment. They have dropped the social focus in favor of an economic one, wishing to

balance the budget instead of income and opportunities.
In the process, Colorado and Blanco ideologies grew more and more similar,

which led to close political cooperation unimaginable before the rise of the Frente
Amplio. The clearest sign of realignment was the blanquicolorado agreement, established
immediately after the end of the dictatorship. The agreement has been the only way many
laws opposed by the left have been passed — neither traditional party has the strength to

pass laws by itself. Their cooperation results in the passage of compromises rather than
laws in line with the hard line of the party, such as the law giving amnesty to former
members of the dictatorship, passed during Sanguinetti’s first administration.
results in voter-sharing,

a signal that the Blanco

and Colorado

It also

parties are at least

basically ideologically aligned. Should only one of the two traditional parties make it to

the presidential run-off elections, most traditional party voters will switch from Blanco to
Colorado or Colorado to Blanco rather than support the Frente Amplio, as seen in the
1999 election of Jorge Batlle.
Batllismo, created by Batlle y Orddfiez in the early 1900s and still a very strong
force in Uruguayan politics today, stands as a Frente Amplio ideology now. Present-day
batllismo

no

longer

involves

changing

the political structure

as Batlle

y Ordofiez

attempted to do with the collegial executive, but Batlle y Orddjiez’ original focus on an
extensive state-backed social welfare net girded by nationalized industries continues to be

the definition of batllismo. Batllismo was in part responsible for the Frente Amplio’s
victory — although Uruguayans show high levels of party loyalty, they are more loyal to
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the ideology of the early Colorado party than the party itself, and have moved to follow it
as it shifted to the Frente Amplio. As the Colorados and Blancos moved further and
further away from the paternal welfare state ideas and towards an elite-led, market-based
system, the voters turned increasingly to the party still representing the ideas Uruguayans
had been supporting for decades: the Frente Amplio. This pattern was reinforced by the

failures of the Blanco and Colorado parties in handling the transition to democracy in
1985 and the economic crises in 1990 and 2001 — voters saw that the ideas espoused by
the traditional parties did not work and wanted to return to the old batllista system.
Both traditional parties claim to have a social focus in their 2004 programs, but

neither still adheres to batllismo. Both Colorados and Blancos talk more about the
expenditures associated with social programs and the need to cut back than they do about
the equality of opportunity
indicators from Jorge

and living standards

associated with batllismo.

Batlle’s presidency imply that the Colorados

Certain

were no longer

preoccupied with social programs — poverty among children rose, along with the dropout
rate. The Blancos under Lacalle, from 1990 to 1995, also proved that their focus was

economic recuperation through neoliberal economic policies, rather than social equality.
Lacalle’s economic adjustment, although necessary given the dire economic straits the
country found itself in, made no allowance for protecting the lower classes from the
negative impact of the adjustment.
In the post-dictatorial period,

the party advocating

citizen rights and

social

welfare has been the Frente Amplio. Their 2004 party program does not include any
reduction of the state’s role in the society. They intend to expand nationalization of
industries, as Batlle y Ordofiez advocated in the early 1900s. They also advocate a more
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efficient state role in social spending and welfare, not a decreased one. In the program,

Vazquez enumerates each of the social problems that need to be targeted, and wants to
take money from inefficient or unnecessary sectors of government social spending and

move it to eliminate those problems. The party believes that a “productive Uruguay” can
be synonymous with a batllista Uruguay.
Vazquez’s administration has been able to implement the policies promised,
although not without problems that resulted in a dip in public opinion. His economic
policies have not been in line with what Uruguayans expected from the Frente Amplio,
since he has focused on foreign investment and trade for economic recuperation, but
social policies

and rights formed

the foundation

of the Frente Amplio’s

plans

for

government and Vazquez’s social plans have been true to his original intentions.'’” The
National Attention to Social Emergency Plan (PANES), drawn up to focus aid to those in
extreme poverty, has been especially well-recognized publicly and successful. A tenth of
the country was left in poverty after the 2001 economic crisis, and PANES

gave them

monthly transfers to live on, as well as new health and education programs to help them
change their circumstance. This plan, along with other social plans, brought poverty
down to 21% from 32%, from 2005 to 2009. Vazquez has also re-established collective

bargaining for wages and begun investigations into the human rights violations of the
dictatorship period, still a sensitive subject for many Uruguayans.!”8
A brief comparison with the experiences of the Concertacion in Chile and the
Partido dos Trabalhadores in Brazil illustrates that the Frente Amplio’s success is part of

a broader Latin American wave with important particularities. All three groups moved
'” Beagle, Matthew. “Uruguay’s Tabaré Vazquez: Pink Tide or Political Voice of the Center?” COHA
Memorandum to the Press. 4 Mar 2006.

'8 Altman, Castiglioni, and Luna, 164-5.
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from the radical left to the center-left in order to secure votes and to increase the size of

the coalition, although the Chilean coalition’s move to moderate policies occurred rapidly
in response to repression under Pinochet while the Brazilian and Uruguayan

parties

became more moderate through a long process. Economic crises and budget deficits have

led all three parties to seek market-friendly social policies to avoid alienating business
interests.'”

The approach to these market-friendly social policies varies with each party. The
Chilean party’s approach can be described as “neo-liberalism with a human face,” or
market-driven economics paired with social policies to take care of those left behind by
the markets.
'®° Groups advocating the rights of the poor were greatly weakened
unable to have

much

of a voice

in the new

social

system

interests.'®! The Brazilian PT and Uruguayan

Frente Amplio

inclusion over

only recently

economic

strength,

and have

dominated

by private

both emphasize
adopted

and

social

market-friendly

policies (2002 in Brazil, 2004 in Uruguay). With the new economic approach, the two
parties also changed their social programs to target more effectively those who would be
most affecte d.' An emphasis on participatory politics has strengthened interest groups
in both countries, and the government continues to play the most active role in social

welfare.'®? Although the Chilean party has lost some leftist voters because of neoliberal

policies, on the whole the parties’ economic plans have been more successful than those
of countries governed by radical leftist parties.'**

"° Panizza, 96-97.

189 Navia, Patricio. “The successful Chilean left: neo-liberal and socialist.” Leftovers: Tales of the Latin

American Left. Eds. Castafieda, Jorge G. and Marco A. Morales. New York: Routledge, 2008.
181 Castiglioni, 3, 93.

'82 panizza, 98-100.

183B aiocchi and Checa, 105-7.
184 Panizza, 98, 100.
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The Uruguayan case is unique because of batllismo’s resilience. The extensive
social programs

in place in Uruguay prior to 1973 were largely left in place by the

dictatorship, rather than dismantled as in Chile. The historical nature of the social welfare

programs

also made

it difficult to dismantle — the paternalistic system had

been

developing since the early 1900s under the guidance of José Batlle y Orddfiez, the most
celebrated Uruguayan politician and a national symbol. Batllismo is very much a part of
the Uruguayan political culture, so much so that even a dictatorship cannot ignore it due
to its widespread popular support. Efforts to roll back the government’s role in social

welfare

did

not

occur

until

the

re-democratization

period,

and

were

largely

unsuccessful.'** The Frente Amplio built its support on the promise of restoring the
batllista system, with high government involvement and redistribution of wealth, while
reforming it to fit with the economic realities of budget deficit and the market-driven
global market.

This commitment

to continuity of the original system contributed to

Frente Amplio success in the polls.
The Uruguayan government and Frente Amplio do not have the same political
problems

that the Brazilian government

and PT have experienced.

Party

loyalty

is

stronger in Uruguay, making the Frente Amplio’s gains more permanent than that of the

PT. Both parties govern with participatory democracy, allowing unorganized citizens and
movements alike the chance to be heard. However, with the corruption crisis in Brazil in
2005 along with other political crises in the 2000s, the PT has tarnished its image as the
“people’s party” by proving its lack of transparency as well as its similarities to other

parties with more authoritarian ideas about the popular role in government. The Frente
Amplio has not experienced a loss of faith in its goals. That could change over time and
'85 Castiglioni, 3, 41-2.
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the party could fall prey to the same problems that caused the PT to stumble -- or the
Frente Amplio

could successfully maintain its standings as the people’s party and a

defender of participatory democracy and transparency.

An urgent question is whether the Frente Amplio can win the presidency again in
the elections

of October

2009.

Based

on public

reception of the Frente Amplio

performance in the executive, the party will most likely retain a majority of their voters
be able to win the election once again. Public opinion polls currently show the Frente

Amplio leading with 43%, but indicate the elections might enter a run-off with the
Blancos, polling at 38%. Should a run-off take place, the 7% of the vote currently held by

Colorados could combine with the Blanco vote to elect a Blanco president. 11% of the
country, however, is undecided.'®* Despite the possibility of a run-off, public opinion
polls make it clear that the Frente Amplio’s success in being elected will be a long-

standing success. The Uruguayan political landscape has been permanently changed with
the addition of a third major player, and the two traditional parties will likely need to
cooperate at least in the immediate future to carry out any programs.

'86 MercoPress. “Polls Show Opposition Ahead of Uruguay’s Ruling Coalition.” 12 Mar 2009.
<http://en.mercopress.com/2009/03/12/polls-show-opposition-ahead-of-uruguays-ruling-coalition>.
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